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1 Introduction
During the last decade, policymakers and researchers have wondered how the success
of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurialism and venture capital finance can be replicated in
other regions of the world. Whereas the success story of Silicon Valley certainly has
various aspects, one critical factor seems to be the use of venture capital (Armour
and Cumming, 2006).
By providing financing to new firms that may not otherwise have access to capital
markets, venture capital is a very important source of funding for innovation (OECD,
2012b). Venture capital helps bring innovations to the market quickly and thereby
creates not only opportunities for further technological innovation but also economic
growth, economic flexibility, and jobs (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Therefore, many
countries seek to improve the supply of venture capital (OECD, 2012b).
Venture capital accounts for a subset of private equity investment, differentiated by
the fact that funds are provided for businesses at an early stage in their development,
before any profit has been made. Venture capitalists raise their investment funds from
end-investors and invest actively in their portfolio companies - that is, they develop
specialized industry expertise and establish sophisticated contracts that create a
place for the venture capitalist on the board of directors of the funded company
(Armour and Cumming, 2006). In exchange for the capital provided to start-ups,
venture capitalists receive an equity ownership stake in the financed company (Florida
and Kenney, 1988). Venture capitalists normally hold their investments for three
to seven years, after which returns can be realized through trade sales (mergers
1
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and acquisitions) or initial public offerings (IPOs) on stock markets (Armour and
Cumming, 2006; OECD, 2013a).
In the United States, the shift from traditional financial institutions (such as banks)
to institutional sources of finance like venture capital was facilitated by the reductions
in the tax rate on capital gains and the changes of federal restrictions on public
pension fund investments, which created an incentive for pension funds to engage
in partnership investments. Apart from that, the active sponsorship of firms by
investment banks in the public securities market contributed to an increased investor
confidence in the long-term sustainability of venture capital as an investment channel
(Florida and Kenney, 1988).
Venture capital was the main contributor to the funding of every surge of innovation
in the Silicon Valley area, e.g., the establishment of the semiconductor industry in
the 1960s, the start of the personal computer industry and the biotech industry
in the 1970s, of the workstation and networking industries in the 1980s, and the
commercialization of the internet in the 1990s (Banatao and Fong, 2000 cited in
Zhang, 2007). In the past three decades, almost every successful start-up in Silicon
Valley received local venture capital funding (Zhang, 2007; Ferrary and Granovetter,
2009).
Although the growth rate of venture capital has been high in many countries, there
are still large differences in the funding levels across countries (Jeng and Wells, 2000).
As venture capital is demanded only in presence of entrepreneurs seeking capital for
their start-ups, the differences in venture capital (VC) investments are linked to the
level of entrepreneurship in a country (Freytag and Thurik, 2007).
In Europe, venture capital markets seem significantly less developed than in the
US, both in terms of the amount invested and the amount per investment. The
financial crisis enlarged the existing gap at the seed and early stage: bank lending to
start-ups declined further and VC firms became more risk averse due to pressures on
the industry and therefore preferred to invest at later stages where risks are lower,
leaving gaps at the pre-seed and seed stages (OECD, 2013a).
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Angel investors aimed to fill these financing gaps left by banks and VC firms and could
indeed increase the total deal size for start-ups seeking early-stage financing. Angel
investors individually invest "their own money predominantly in seed or start-up
companies and are financially independent, i.e., a possible total loss of their business
angel investments will not significantly change the economic situation of their assets"
(EBAN, 2014a). Therefore, individual business angels played an essential role in
building up the formal venture capital industry as they often were the primary source
of external seed- and early-stage equity financing in many countries and hence served
as a predecessor to venture capital (Ibrahim, 2010; OECD, 2011).
This study mainly builds on the work of Black and Gilson (1998), Jeng and Wells
(2000), and Schröder (2013). Whereas Black and Gilson (1998) analyzed the signifi-
cance of well-developed stock markets and initial public offerings (IPOs) for venture
capital financing, Jeng and Wells (2000) expanded upon the regression by adding
many other factors such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and market capitaliza-
tion growth, labor market rigidities, financial reporting standards, private pension
funds, and government programs. Consistent with Black and Gilson (1998) who found
that stock market-centered systems which permit venture capitalists to exit through
an IPO are crucial to the existence of a strong venture capital market, Jeng and
Wells (2000) also found that IPOs are the most important determinant of venture
capital investing. Additionally, they showed that different types of venture capital are
differently affected by the independent variables included in their study: Labor market
rigidities, for example, negatively affect early-stage venture capital investments, but
do not impact venture capital investments at the later stage (ibid.).
Schröder (2013) enhances the analysis of Jeng and Wells (2000) by including the role
of the banking sector in explaining diverging levels in early-stage VC investments
across countries. Schröder (2013) supports the results of Black and Gilson (1998),
arguing that banks are not able to duplicate the implicit contract regarding future
control as a market-based system can. Schröder (2013) concludes that stock markets
are complements for venture capital whereas banks are substitutes.
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Further previous literature related to this study include Schwienbacher (2002), who
studied exit decisions of American and European venture capitalists, and Hege et al.
(2003), who conducted a comparative micro-level study of the performance of venture
financing between the United States and Europe.
Schwienbacher (2002) reported that replacement of the entrepreneur, reporting
requirements, and stage financing affect the venture’s likelihood of an IPO. He stated
that the most striking difference between European and American venture capitalists
is the significantly lower use of convertible securities by European venture capitalists.
Cumming (2002) found similar results in various European countries; so did Bascha
and Walz (2001) in Germany.
Hege et al. (2003) demonstrated the existance of a significant gap of performance
between VC firms in the US and their European counterparts, both in terms of the
type of exit and the rate to return. They find that differences in the contractual
relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are causing these per-
formance differences: American venture capitalists more strongly insist on keeping
contingent control rights, i.e., through the use of convertible securities (ibid.).
Bottazzi and DaRin (2002a) compared Europe’s aggregate VC investment flows to
the US and study the effect of VC financing on Europe’s innovative companies listed
on Euro.nm, the European market network that includes national stock markets from
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. They reported that venture
capital does help European companies to develop and go public on the Euro.nm,
which positively contributes to the growth of Europe’s stock markets (ibid.).
The cultural variables introduced in this study stem from the literature linking
culture to entrepreneurial activity in a country, measured by self-employment levels.
Audretsch et al. (2002) and Freytag and Thurik (2007) mainly contributed to this
literature.
Audretsch et el. (2002) provided a unified framework for understanding and analyzing
the determinants of entrepreneurship and conducted case studies in the United
States, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. They argued that national culture
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may have an influence on both the supply and demand side of entrepreneurship:
Individual preferences for self-employment are shaped by a country’s prevailing
attitude towards entrepreneurship. Further, the prevalence of entrepreneurial values
in politics may influence the degree of entry regulation of new start-ups and the
extent to which an innovative entrepreneurial ecosystem is encouraged through private-
public partnerships (ibid.). Empirically investigating the impact of institutional and
cultural factors on the individual decision to become an entrepreneur, Freytag and
Thurik (2007) also found that cultural aspects constrain the behavior of would-be
entrepreneurs and are thereby assumed to impact the attitudes of investors, such as
the attitude towards risk and loss of control. As the supply of VC involves high risk,
risk adversity is likely to negatively influence the development of the venture capital
market of a country (ibid.).
Authors that used Hofstede’s (1980) indices - individualism, masculinity, power
distance and uncertainty avoidance - in order to link culture to entrepreneurial
activity include Shane (1992, 1993), Baum et al. (1993), and Acs et al. (1994).
According to Shane (1992; 1993), lower power distance, lower uncertainty avoidance,
higher masculinity and higher individualism stimulate entrepreneurship. In contrast,
the findings of Baum et al. (1993) suggest that organizations in countries with
higher power distance, higher uncertainty avoidance, lower masculinity and lower
individualism would increase entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, Acs et al. (1994)
came to the conclusion that higher uncertainty avoidance and lower individualism
lead to higher levels of self-employment. Wennekers et al. (2007) and Noorderhaven
et al. (1999) confirmed that higher uncertainty avoidance leads to a higher level
of entrepreneurial activity in a country (and hence to a higher demand for VC
investments).
The difference in the development stage of VC markets across countries is represented
by a broadly asymmetric situation on the research side: The majority of research on
VC is centered on North America while there has been very little empirical research
conducted on the European VC market (Hege et al., 2003). Studies comparing the
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US to European VC industries remain rare and mostly concentrate on economic and
institutional variables explaining different levels of VC investments across countries,
without taking into account several cultural aspects.
The importance of (formal and informal) institutions for the economic development
of a country was particularly well analyzed by North (1994), who pointed out that
“institutions are the humanly-devised constraints that structure human interaction.
They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal
constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self imposed codes of conduct), and
the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1994, p. 359).
It is essential for policymakers to understand how to effectively contribute to a
vibrant VC industry. Although efforts have been made in several countries to foster
entrepreneurship through the creation of public financial institutions offering funding
to high-potential start-ups, government authorities often did not take into account
the more informal function of VC firms, which goes far beyond the pure financing
function (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009). Hence, it is not clear which policy measures
would be most appropriate and effective to nourish a country’s VC industry. Here
the lack of investigation is most apparent (Hege et al., 2003).
If the long indicated gap in VC investments between the US and Europe is confirmed
in the data, which institutional factors could explain it? Do North’s “informal
constraints”, and hence the cultural variables, also play a role? And is the gap
in amounts invested still true for the period since the late 1990s, when early-stage
financing quickly increased in Europe (Hege et al., 2003)?
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of early-stage VC invest-
ments by identifying characteristics in the economic, institutional, as well as cultural
framework that could explain the diverging levels of early-stage VC investments across
countries. Data was assembled for 16 countries during the period from 1995 until
2013.
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The economic variables used to predict the level of early-stage VC investments in
this study include GDP growth, openness, the unemployment rate, R&D expenditures,
and the NASDAQ Composite Index. The institutional variables that are expected to
explain the level of early-stage VC funds invested are government stability, socioeco-
nomic conditions, bureaucracy quality, and the investment profile. To examine the
impact of cultural factors on early-stage VC investments, the study includes the four
cultural indices of Hofstede (1980): individualism, masculinity, power distance and
uncertainty avoidance. The study investigates empirically whether and how these
characteristics contribute to the level of venture capital funding.
The main results of the study are the following: First, the data confirm that there is
a significant gap in the amounts invested by VC firms between the United States and
Europe for the period under study from 1995 to 2013. This gap might be attributable
to several important differences in the economic, institutional, or cultural environment
of both continents. The results indicate that countries that are more open to trade,
measured by the variable openness, are associated with higher levels in early-stage
venture capital. Higher R&D expenditures as a proxy for the technological and
innovation capacity in a country as well as a higher value in the NASDAQ Composite
Index as a proxy for general stock market conditions result in a higher amount of
early-stage VC investments. Moreover, the results reveal that favorable socioeconomic
conditions for both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists positively correlate with
early-stage VC investments. In terms of the cultural environment, the results show
that higher degrees of masculinity and power distance result in more early-stage
venture capital invested whereas a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance negatively
affects early-stage VC investments.
Understanding the economic, institutional, and cultural influences on the development
of the venture capital industry and hence of entrepreneurial potential is essential to
the internationalization of entrepreneurship theory and significantly contributes to
the VC industry literature (Thomas and Mueller, 2000).
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These findings help provide advice for nations aiming to develop their venture capital
markets in order to encourage innovation and foster entrepreneurship.
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 relates to the importance of entrepreneur-
ship for economic growth and focuses on the entrepreneur in economic history. In
chapter 3, the theoretical framework and the tested hypotheses are presented. Chapter
4 discusses the data and covers the regression methodology. Section 4.4 presents the
empirical results of the study.
Taking into consideration that total angel investment is found to be much greater
than overall VC investment, both in the US and in some European countries, the
importance of angel investment as a predecessor of venture capital investments will
be discussed in chapter 5. A special investigation of the angel investment markets in
the US, France, and Germany is undertaken at this point.
Chapter 6 analyzes the venture capital industries in the United States and Europe,
with particular focus on Germany and France, and tries to identify institutional
and cultural framework conditions in place that may explain the different levels
of VC investments in the respective countries. Apart from cultural characteristics
such as national attitudes towards entrepreneurship and risk-taking, the countries’
labor regulations, tax systems, type of investors working in VC funds, bankruptcy
legislation, and access to stock markets will be examined. In this regard, the crucial
factors contributing to the success story of the innovative cluster in Silicon Valley
shall also be demonstrated and discussed. Additionally, the chapter examines current
policy measures that have been implemented in the different countries to encourage
entrepreneurship and nurture the national VC market. Chapter 7 concludes.
2 Entrepreneurship as Human Action:
The Entrepreneur in Economic
Theory
In their efforts to explain entrepreneurship, researchers have recently shifted their
focus away from equilibrium approaches, which concentrate on certain personality
types of people in society who prefer to become entrepreneurs, towards an individual-
opportunity relationship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000 cited in Acs and Varga,
2005). This relationship shows the individual response of the entrepreneur to the
existence of an opportunity, his or her identification and discovery of opportunity, and
the process of exploitation (Shane, 2003 cited in Acs and Varga, 2005). In the 20th
century, three scholars have dominated the economics literature of entrepreneurship:
Schumpeter (1912), who sees innovative entrepreneurs as the main driver to achieve
economic advancement away from the static equilibrium; Knight (1921), who views
the entrepreneur as someone who changes uncertainty into calculable risk; and, more
recently, Kirzner (1979), who believes that the entrepreneur moves the economy
towards an equilibrium state by exploiting arbitrage opportunities (Braunerhjelm
and Svensson, 2010).
9
2 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 10
2.1 Schumpeter’s entrepreneur as the disruptive force
Schumpeter defined the entrepreneur as destructing established routines and not
falling into line with the traditional, old way of doing things. The joy of creation and
the pleasure of success are what stimulate the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. He is a
leader who is able to identify the right way to act. He has a well-developed will to
conquer, the desire to fight, and likes to show his superiority to others (Schumpeter,
1912 cited in Brouwer, 2002). Being rather self-centered, he “has the dream and the
will to found a private kingdom” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 93). In order to introduce his
innovations, he has to resist to his opponent environment, which is generally not open
to non-conformist behavior and novelty (Schumpeter, 1912 cited in Brouwer, 2002).
For Schumpeter, market dynamics are in a continuous state of disequilibrium (Freytag
and Thurik, 2007). Schumpeter strongly rejected the orthodox emphasis on the
perfectly competitive market and stressed the entrepreneurial character of real-life
dynamically competitive processes (Kirzner, 1999). Unlike the neo-classical approach,
which is based on the assumption that markets are in equilibrium and entrepreneurial
activity is not significantly different from innovative activity, the Schumpeterian
tradition makes the entrepreneur the actual cause of pushing the economy out of
equilibrium and bringing industrial dynamics and economic development into motion
(Freytag and Thurik, 2007; Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010).
By introducing new innovations to the market, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur
becomes a disequilibrating force; he distorts the “circular flow” of the economy.
Schumpeter describes the “circular flow” as the prevailing equilibrium of the economy,
in which economic processes are repetitively taking place period after period. The en-
trepreneur drives the economy away from existing structures and creates new, up until
now unknown possibilities (Schumpeter, 1912 cited in Brouwer, 2002; Braunerhjelm
and Svensson, 2010). This process, which Schumpeter called “creative destruction”,
is the foundation of economic development (Hébert and Link, 1989). Therefore,
Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs do not simply adjust markets, they create and destroy
them (Casson, 2003).
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As established firms are not willing to change their routines and will engage in
innovation only by the time their assets have become outdated, entrepreneurs have
to start up new firms. Not being hindered by former investments, new firms will
accelerate economic progress by introducing innovations before the already well-
established firms would. With losses caused by the new firms on currently established
firms, the process of creative destruction comes about (Brouwer, 2002).
The Schumpeterian process of economic development can be divided into three clearly
separated stages: In the first stage, the invention takes place, hence the technical
discovery of new products or processes (Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010). For
Schumpeter, the invention is a scientific activity which does not necessarily result
from economic advancement (Casson, 2003). In the following innovation stage, the new
good or service resulting from technical discoveries will be successfully commercialized
(Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010).
The inventor develops a technique which the innovator - the entrepreneur - tries to
exploit in the second stage (Casson, 2003). Thus, the function of the entrepreneur
is not to invent anything or develop the method which the venture exploits, but “it
consists in getting things done” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 132).
The entrepreneur cannot directly influence the creation of technological opportunity
itself, but he can identify and exploit existing opportunities: “Economic leadership in
particular must hence be distinguished from “invention” (Braunerhjelm and Svensson,
2010). Unless they are not carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant.
To carry any improvement into effect is a task entirely different from the inventing of
it, and a task, moreover, requiring entirely different kinds of aptitudes (Schumpeter,
1911, pp. 88-89 cited in Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010).
According to Schumpeter, the existence of opportunity needed the introduction of
new knowledge which is created by changes in technology. Therefore, (technological)
opportunity comes in part from the research and development (R&D) process that
occurs in society. As technological change enables the allocation of resources in a
different and potentially more efficient way, it is an important source of entrepreneurial
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opportunity (Casson, 1995 cited in Acs and Varga, 2005). In his later editions of
“The Theory of Economic Development”, Schumpeter (1911) emphasized that he was
not so much interested in the individuality of entrepreneurs and in the specific causes
of technological change, as in the mechanism of change itself (Ulijn and Brown, 2003).
Within the innovation process, Schumpeter sees two important functions of the
entrepreneur: First, while being involved in the new firm, he has to motivate not
only himself but also the other actors to undertake an extensive program of collective
learning (Ulijn and Brown, 2003). To achieve this commitment by establishing
formal hierarchical power is not possible; therefore, informal, effective collaboration
is needed which in turn requires the same interests and social obligations of the
participants (Ulijn and Weggeman, 2001 cited in Ulijn and Brown, 2003). Secondly,
the entrepreneur has to guarantee certainty and acts as the center of trust. Therefore,
whereas his first function consists of creating and sharing the vision of exploiting a
great opportunity, the second function involves convincing all participants that this
vision can actually be realized (Ulijn and Brown, 2003).
Moreover, Schumpeter differentiates among five types of innovation: (1) the introduc-
tion of a new product (or an improvement of the quality of an existing product), (2)
the introduction of a new production technique, (3) the development of new markets
(particularly an export market in a new area), (4) the opening up of a new source
of supply of materials and (5) the creation of a new kind of industrial organization
(Casson, 2003; Schumpeter, 1942).
Although Schumpeter was aware that innovation contains risk, he did not see en-
trepreneurs as risk-takers. In his opinion, the capitalists who financed entrepreneurial
ventures were the ones who effectively took a risk (Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010).
The entrepreneur would only bear risk if he financed his ventures himself (Casson,
2003). Therefore, he has to convince the banker who will finance him, but he also
has to make an impact on the social group and convince the consumers to want new
products or variations of products that they have already been using (Schumpeter,
1934 cited in Uijn and Brown, 2003).
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2.2 Knight’s entrepreneur as the risk-taker
As one of the founding fathers of the famous Chicago School of Economics, Knight
(1921) contrasted, but also complemented, Schumpeter’s view of the entrepreneur by
developing the part of entrepreneurial economics that focuses on the entrepreneur’s
role as a risk-taker (Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 2010; Brouwer, 2002). The Knightian
tradition stresses two important functions of the entrepreneur: (1) to provide en-
trepreneurial inputs and (2) to bear risk (and receive a profit for it). The entrepreneur’s
function as a provider of entrepreneurial inputs underlines the entrepreneurial ability
of foresight or correct judgment. The second risk bearer function sheds light on the
presence of risk in the occupational choice decision (Freytag and Thurik, 2007).
In his work, Knight emphasizes the intuitive and mainly non-rational facets of
entrepreneurship. The ability of the entrepreneur to see certain qualities in people
that are not perceived by the average observer gives her prophetic traits. This is also
why only the entrepreneur with above-average perception skills can make profit under
the condition that capital markets are well organized (Brouwer, 2002).
Knight (1921) examined Schumpeter’s disregard of uncertainty in his seminal work
“Risk, Uncertainty and Profit” which contributed to the foundation of modern finance
and organization theory and fully analyzed the distinction between uncertainty and
risk (Brouwer, 2002; Garcia-Ruiz and Toninelli, 2010). Whereas Knight defines
risks as those uncertainties of economic life whose probability can be calculated,
uncertainties cannot be measured as they involve new and unfamiliar situations
(García-Ruiz and Toninelli, 2010).
For Knight, uncertainty is a situation where neither a priori reasoning nor statistical
inference (as the situation is unique and does not belong to a larger group of identical
events) can calculate the probabilities of alternative outcomes (Casson, 2003). In
dealing with these two phenomena, the role of the entrepreneur becomes essential
(García-Ruiz and Toninelli, 2010): In the business world, decisions on inputs must be
made in advance so that output can be created in the future.
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Factors owned by households have to be paid for immediately, even if households
are unwilling to commit on future demand for the product under the anticipation of
unforeseeable events (ibid.).
Hence, because of time lags in production, unanticipated changes in household
situations, and the absence of forward markets in the product, producers have to
deal with uncertainty regarding product demand. In this context, Knight shows
how markets and corporations handle the problem of uncertainty by giving decision-
making responsibility to those who are best at bearing uncertainty – the entrepreneurs.
Foresight is the most important quality that is needed to make production decisions
under uncertainty (Knight, 1921).
According to Knight, entrepreneurs do have a greater ability of foreseeing events
which enables them to reduce and eventually eliminate uncertainty (Casson, 2003).
Predicting possible outcomes means estimating the probabilities of the occurrence of
every possible outcome. In Knight’s view, this requires the entrepreneur’s judgment
and intuition, especially judgment about people’s abilities: “Business judgment is
chiefly judgment of men” (Knight, 1921, p. 291 cited in Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).
People not only differ “in their capacity by perception and inference to form correct
judgments as to the future course of events in the environment” (Knight, 1921, p.
241), but also in their ability to judge other people’s capacities (Langlois and Cosgel,
1993; Casson, 2003). These differences among people will lead to their specialization
according to their skills (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). In the environment of the firm
this means that uncertainty will result in “the tendency of the groups themselves
to specialize, finding the individuals with the greatest managerial capacity of the
requisite kinds and placing them in charge of the work of the group, submitting the
activities of the other members to their direction and control” (Knight, 1921, p. 269
cited in Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).
Knight believes the entrepreneurs to have the greatest capacity of judging other
people’s abilities. As the judgment about other people’s capacities can be seen as
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a judgment about outcomes directly, the accuracy of his judgment determines the
amount of the entrepreneur’s income (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993).
In order to deal with uncertainty about newly-emerging situations, the reliance on
judgment is very important (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). Thus, Knight considers
confidence in her own judgment as one of the most important characteristics of the
entrepreneur. Also, the entrepreneur should have a fairly low aversion to risk, as her
judgment will be backed with her own capital. In Knight’s view, the most important
determinant of the level of profit and of the number of entrepreneurs is the elasticity
of supply of self-confident individuals (Casson, 2003).
2.3 Kirzner’s distinctively alert entrepreneur
Another more recent and quite provocative theory of entrepreneurship has been
developed by Mises’ former student Isreal Kirzner (Hébert and Link, 1989). By means
of a distinctive alertness, the Kirznerian entrepreneur exploits profit opportunities
at a different stage of the product life cycle than Schumpeterian ones (Freytag and
Thurik, 2007). Whereas Schumpeter’s entrepreneur disorders the equilibrium by
launching major innovations, Kirzner’s entrepreneur starts off from disequilibrium
and by correcting inconsistencies in supply and demand, he moves the economy
towards the equilibrium. Besides being prescient, bold, self-confident, creative, and
innovative, the Kirznerian entrepreneur’s common characteristic that makes it possible
to successfully exploit arbitrage opportunities is his entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner,
1979 cited in McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). According to Kirzner, entrepreneurial
alertness is necessary for the appropriate functioning of the economy and describes
a situation where the market offers a profitable opportunity that is successfully
exploited by the entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1973, 1980 cited in McMullen and Shepherd,
2006).
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In his lectures, Kirzner often mentioned the analogy that the entrepreneur is the one
who, after noticing a $10 bill on the floor in front of him, is alert to the presence
of the money and grabs it. The more alert individual will grab the money rapidly
whereas the less alert will take more time to observe this opportunity and benefit
from it (Rothbard, 1985). “Without knowing what to look for, without deploying
any deliberate search technique, the entrepreneur is at all times scanning the horizon,
as it were, ready to make discoveries” (Kirzner, 1997, p. 72). Therefore, alertness
enables individuals to interfere in the market process by changing the price while
others will react merely by alternating their buying or selling behavior in relation to
the most recent price (Casson, 2003).
In a dynamic economy, knowledge cannot be complete or perfect so that markets are
always in disequilibrium, which opens opportunities to the entrepreneur. These profit
opportunities are the result of former entrepreneurial errors that led to shortages,
surpluses or misallocated resources (Kirzner, 1997). The entrepreneur’s function is
hence to attain the adjustment of prices that is required to move the economy toward
an equilibrium state (Hébert and Link, 1989).
If different prices exist in the same market, the entrepreneur could take advantage of
an arbitrage opportunity as there will be a buyer or seller who is willing to pay a
higher price or accept a lower one for some product. Thus, entrepreneurs will sell
where prices are too high and buy where prices are too low. Also, in case prices of
inputs do not coincide with the prices of outputs, the entrepreneur could expand
production of some products while cutting the creation of others (Casson, 2003).
This will cause prices to adjust and steer output and input qualities towards values
coherent with the market equilibrium (Casson, 2003; Kirzner, 1997).
Kirzner’s approach to entrepreneurship was highly influenced by three important
ideas: (1) Mises’ principal view of the market as an entrepreneurial process, (2)
Hayek’s understanding that the market creates a learning process, and (3) the belief
that entrepreneurship is part of creative discovery (Kirzner, 1985, cited by Hébert
and Link, 1989).
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Mises taught Kirzner that the market is driven by the entrepreneurs: “The driving
force of the market process is provided neither by the consumers nor by the owners
of the means of productions – land, capital goods, and labor – but by the promoting
and speculating entrepreneurs” (Mises, 1949, p. 325 cited in Kirzner, 1997). For
Mises, the market process is determined by the speculative actions of entrepreneurs
who recognize profit opportunities in the state of disequilibrium. Mises stated that
entrepreneurship is human action when considering the uncertainty that every action
contains (Mises, 1949 cited in Kirzner, 1997). This means that all decisions made by
economic agents must necessarily have a speculative character which is fundamental
to entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1997). Kirzner also sees the aim of economic theory in
explaining behavior in terms of intentional human action, and to reflect in how far
intentional human actions can interact to bring about unexpected outcomes (Casson,
2003).
Hayek sees the empirical content of economics in the process of adjustment towards
an equilibrium. During this process that he calls competition, the market agents
acquire and communicate knowledge (Casson, 2003). Wishes and desires of consumers,
for instance, cannot properly be considered as given facts but are rather reflecting
problems that competition could solve. Before competition starts, consumers lack the
knowledge they are supposed to possess in a state of competitive equilibrium. Only
during the process of competition do they develop their knowledge of alternatives as
a result of what happens on the market (Hayek, 1946). Hence, humans cannot only
acquire, but also convey, knowledge and abilities through the process of competition
without even being aware of the existence of that knowledge in the first place (Hayek,
2003). The market process enables society to explore the unknown and to discover
new ways of improving their actions and choices (Hayek, 1946). Markets support
people in communicating their discoveries to others so that the inherent dissemination
of information ensures the use of dispersed knowledge (Casson, 2003; Hayek, 2003).
This makes it possible for market agents to coordinate their decisions and therefore
move the economy towards a state of equilibrium (Casson, 2003).
2 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 18
Kirzner appreciated from Hayek the role of knowledge and its improvement through
the market process where agents constantly interact with each other to finally arrive
at the equilibrium state (Kirzner, 1997). The price information to which Kirznerian
entrepreneurs respond is information created by the market itself through the learning
and discovery process originated from Hayek (Casson, 2003).
Kirzner’s inspiration of the Austrian economists’ belief that entrepreneurship is part of
creative discovery becomes particularly clear when looking at this learning process of
acquiring new knowledge: During the discovery process, market participants become
better informed about the entrepreneurial plans of others; thus they can also observe
which courses of action turn out to be successful and which do not (Kirzner, 1997).
Some plans will not work out as a result of initial entrepreneurial error and will
systematically be eliminated as such an erroneous decision will be corrected (Kirzner,
1997).
Further, “the profit opportunities created by earlier entrepreneurial error do tend
systematically to stimulate subsequent entrepreneurial discovery. The entrepreneurial
process so set into motion, is a process tending toward better mutual awareness among
market participants” (Kirzner, 1997, p. 72). Thus, profit does not particularly arise
out of entrepreneurial error, but most importantly out of the compelling incentive to
lessen the occurrence of it (Kirzner, 1997).
As Kirzner limits entrepreneurial activity to the usage of arbitrage opportunities,
he does not attribute a high importance to uncertainty in human decision-making
(Hébert and Link, 1989). With his notion of alertness, Kirzner emphasizes the quality
of perceiving a profit opportunity that really exists. This was highly criticized by
his contemporaries such as Lawrence White (1976) or Murray Rothbard (1985).They
argued that in practicing arbitrage, the entrepreneur copes with present and known
opportunities to take advantage of price differences that surpass transaction costs
over time, yet uncertainty does only exist in relation to the future (Hébert and Link,
1989).
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Hence, any profit opportunity is in reality uncertain (Rothbard, 1985). Kirzner
later asserted that uncertainty is indeed essential to the notion of entrepreneurship
but still believes that the link is more indirect than assumed by former writers on
entrepreneurship theory. For Kirzner, entrepreneurs who practice arbitrage do discover
past error whereas entrepreneurs who face uncertainty have to make market decisions
in numerous periods using their imagination and creativity. Therefore, Kirzner reckons
that time and uncertainty may change the form of entrepreneurial action but they do
not affect its substantial function (Hébert and Link, 1989; Rothbard, 1985).
3 Theoretical Framework and
Hypotheses
This empirical analysis is based on theoretical approaches that enable the derivation
of testable hypotheses which are then examined in the empirical work.
In this section, the theoretical framework and testable hypotheses of the analysis are
outlined. A range of important factors that can possibly affect the level of early-stage
venture capital (VC) investments will be discussed, especially focusing on economic,
institutional and cultural differences across countries.
An important economic matter in the theoretical venture capital literature points to
the technological and innovation capacity of a country (proxied by R&D expenditures),
highly incentivizing venture capitalists to invest in young and promising businesses
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Institutional factors are expected to influence VC
investments in several ways: Through the legal environment for businesses, the
socioeconomic conditions businesses and investors operate in, the administrative
quality of a country and through a country’s investment profile (Audretsch et al.,
2002). Additionally, levels of VC investments are assumed to differ according to
various cultural characteristics of a country (Hofstede et al., 2004).
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3.1 Economic Influences on Venture Capital
Investments
The VC industry is affected by the state of a country’s economic environment. Aspects
such as macroeconomic fluctuations and stock market conditions influence start-up
activity and thus have an impact on VC funds as more start-ups increase the demand
for VC investments in an economy (Acs and Audretsch, 1994; Jeng and Wells, 2000).
Consistent with past literature, GDP growth and openness are included in this
regression to capture a country’s economic state (Jeng and Wells, 2000). If the
country is growing quickly, there may be better opportunities for entrepreneurs
to start new ventures and a higher survival rate of potential portfolio companies
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Schröder, 2013). Similarly, openness to trade provides
access to a wider variety of goods and hence to new technology, which may bring
about more business opportunities for potential entrepreneurs (Harrison, 1996).
As GDP growth represents a measure for macroeconomic fluctuations in this study,
GDP growth should be positively correlated with the level of early-stage VC investments
(Hypothesis 1.1.). An economy that is more open to trade, reflected by higher values
in imports and exports, is assumed to experience faster technological progress and
productivity growth (Romer, 1990), resulting in more opportunities for innovative
start-ups that demand venture capital. Therefore, openness should go along with
more early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 1.2.).
Unemployment was also regularly used in past research as an important economic fac-
tor variable explaining the differences in entrepreneurship across countries. Analyzing
the casual relationship between unemployment and the level of entrepreneurship, bidi-
rectional ramification may appear plausible: on the one hand, unemployment is likely
to reduce entrepreneurship since unemployment is associated with economic decline,
decreasing the availability of business opportunities. Therefore, self-employment
becomes less profitable, resulting in fewer start-ups created and hence fewer VC
investments demanded. On the other hand, unemployment may have a “push effect”,
3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 22
increasing entrepreneurship as unemployed persons become self-employed sooner if
opportunity costs are comparatively low (Hofstede et al., 2004). As the view of un-
employment as an indicator of a general weakness in the economy appears to be more
convincing regarding the VC industry, a negative relationship between unemployment
and early-stage VC investments is expected in this study (Hypothesis 1.3.).
In order to control for a country’s technological and innovation capacity, related
research included R&D expenditures within the business enterprise sector as a relevant
explanatory variable for early-stage VC investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1998;
Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003; Kortum and Lerner, 2000;
Schröder, 2013). In countries with strong dynamics of research activities, the discovery
of new technology becomes more likely and so does the arrival of entrepreneurial
opportunities (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). As outlined in chapter 2, Schumpeter
also sees the introduction of new knowledge as fundamental for entrepreneurial
opportunities as it enables the allocation of resources in a different and potentially
more efficient way (Casson, 1995 cited in Acs and Varga, 2005). Therefore, a higher
R&D expenditure in one country than another may bring about a larger number of
potential entrepreneurs with promising ideas which would increase the demand for
venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1998). Thus, R&D expenditures are assumed
to be positively correlated with early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 1.4.).
Since the main risk faced by investors and venture capitalists is to not get a return
on their investment, viable IPO markets are extremely important for the venture
capital industry. Black and Gilson (1998) cited in Jeng and Wells (2000) state that
the IPO exit mechanism financially incentivizes equity-compensated managers to
increase their effort in the portfolio company. Additionally, it offers them a corporate
control option, since venture capitalists have to renounce their control rights at the
time of the IPO (ibid.). Recognizing that there are various options to liquidate a
fund, the literature suggests that exit through an IPO seems to be among the most
attractive mechanisms (Jeng and Wells, 2000).
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The nature of the exit markets for VC-backed firms is strongly affected by the ability
of banks to own stock in public and private companies. In Germany, for example,
banks owning firms’ stocks may become part of the supervisiory board. In the United
States though, stock ownership is largely dispersed compared to Europe and banks
may not own companies’ stocks. As VC firms in bank-centered systems (such as
Germany) are completely or partially owned by banks (Ooghe et al., 1991 cited in
Bruton et al., 2005), banks tend to invest less in early-stage deals due to inherently
higher risk they are unwilling to take (Bruton et al., 2005). Historically, high-tech
firms had little opportunity to go public in Europe. Yet, in the late 1990s, Europe’s
main countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium) created
technology-angled stock markets that made the IPO exit markets between the US
and Europe more similar (Hege et al., 2009).
A better performing stock market increases the liquidity of IPO exit markets for VC
investments and hence also the expected returns to investment. Given more liquid
exit markets, venture capitalists require a lower rate of return on their investments
(as they are exposed to less risk) and therefore are likely to increase the number of
early-stage investments (Gompers and Lerner, 2000 cited in Cumming et al., 2005).
To provide a proxy for general stock market conditions, the NASDAQ Composite
Index at the end of the investment year is included in this statistical analysis. A
higher NASDAQ Index is supposed to have a positive effect on both the demand and
supply of early-stage VC funds. On the demand side, the profitability of an IPO
exit mechanism due to favorable stock market conditions additionally incentivizes
entrepreneurs to start a business. Similarly, on the supply side, investors are more
likely to supply funds to venture capital firms under the perspective of recouping
their investment later on (Hege et al., 2009). Hence, the NASDAQ Composite Index
is expected to be positively associated with the level of VC investments (Hypothesis
1.5).
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3.2 Institutional Influences on Venture Capital
Investments
As institutions build the framework within which all businesses operate, they often
have an important impact on the position of start-ups in the economy. Even though
macro-economic policies like income policy, labor market regulation or taxation are
not directly targeted to influence the level of entrepreneurship, they are assumed
to have an effect on the level of business ownership and hence the demand for VC
investments (Audretsch et al., 2002).
The balance of entry and exit of firms fundamentally shapes the level of entrepreneur-
ship. In order to monitor the number and quality of young businesses, governmental
institutions control entry and exit flows of entrepreneurial ventures through specific
legislation.
As a proxy for the legislative environment for businesses, the government stability
index is included in this empirical analysis. The index assesses a government’s
ability to carry out its declared programs, measures a government’s unity as well
as the legislative strength of a country. It shall therefore also enclose the legislative
conditions for businesses, including bankruptcy and establishment regulation for
potential entrepreneurs.
If a country’s legislation procedures for starting a business are very burdensome,
time consuming, complex, and costly, there are no incentives for entrepreneurs to
found their own company which results in lower demand for VC investments. Since a
high score in the government stability index implies that the legislative environment
for young businesses does not experience frequent changes and can be considered as
favorable in terms of transparent and affordable establishment regulation as well as
fair bankruptcy legislation, more start-ups are expected to emerge in the economy that
would demand venture capital. Hence, a positive relationship between the government
stability index and early-stage VC investments is assumed (Hypothesis 2.1.).
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Through macro-economic policies, governments shape socioeconomic conditions that
have a significant impact on the trading position of start-ups. Taxation, labor market
regulation, social security or income policy are examples of the policies that determine
the socioeconomic conditions for businesses (Audretsch et al., 2002).
The OECD (1998) states that high tax rates decrease the profitability of entrepreneur-
ship and hinder the foundation of new businesses as well as the expansion of established
companies. Since taxes are based on the firms’ profits, a high tax burden exhausts
the incomes of start-ups, resulting in a potential discouragement of entrepreneurs to
start new ventures.
A flexible labor market is also essential for small businesses to operate well. A strongly
regulated labor market is associated with high costs to “hire and fire” employees
which results in higher risks of business-ownership. Founders will not be able to easily
adjust their team in correspondence to market fluctuations in a rigid labor market.
Further, governments have an impact on the socioeconomic conditions for entrepreneurs
through their social security policies as well as their influence on wages and the relative
gross returns of owning a company. Differences in social security programs between
wage earners/unemployed people and business owners can discourage entrepreneurs
from starting up.
In order to assess the socioeconomic pressures that could constrain businesses, an
index for socioeconomic conditions is used as another institutional variable in this
study. Subcomponents of this index include unemployment, consumer confidence
as well as poverty which are all influenced by the macro-economic policies outlined
above. Assuming that macro-economic polices that reduce the risk for entrepreneurs
of starting up and therefore increase the demand for venture capital result in ad-
vantageous socioeconomic conditions for both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists,
the socioeconomic conditions index is supposed to have a positive relationship with
early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 2.2.).
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The third institutional factor that is assumed to influence the entrepreneurial activity
and therefore the VC investments included in this research is the bureaucracy quality.
When registering a business, entrepreneurs have to go through different administrative
procedures that are costly in terms of monetary and temporal considerations, and
might also be very complex. The costs, time, and complexity of this administrative
process for new start-ups should have an effect on the willingness of entrepreneurs to
start their own business (OECD, 1998 cited in Audretsch et al., 2002). 1
A high quality in bureaucracy would imply that the administrative procedures
of starting a business are first of all not burdensome to entrepreneurs, but also
that the public administration is efficient to process business applications quickly.
Furthermore, a country’s bureaucracy should have the strength and expertise to
govern autonomously from political pressure and be able to adapt to frequent policy
changes (for instance in the tax system) without complications or efficiency losses.
Thus, efficient bureaucracy in a country should decrease the procedural costs of
implementing a business, therefore encouraging entrepreneurial activity and leading
to a higher demand of early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 2.3.).
Audretsch et al. (2002) provide the foundation for Hypotheses 2.1., 2.2. and 2.3.
Finally, a proxy for the investment environment is included in the regression using
the investment profile index. This index assesses the factors influencing the risk to
investment that are not covered by political, economic and financial risk components,
and includes aspects such as contract viability/expropriation, profit repatriation as well
as payment delays. Since VC funding for start-ups involves contracts using securities
and contract instruments allocating contingent control rights to venture capitalists,
contract viability and profit repatriation are essential components affecting the risk
to invest in start-ups (Hege et al., 2003). A secure contracting environment with
low expropriation hazards highly reduces the risks and costs related to transactions
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
1Additionally, entrepreneurs who have to spend more time and energy on administrative duties
in the establishment process of the business will have less time for their actual entrepreneurial
activities, negatively affecting their company (EZ, 1999 cited in Audretsch et al., 2002).
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Venture capital contracts for different types of entrepreneurial firms can involve
different securities (common equity, convertible preferred equity etc.) or other
specific contractual provisions relating to control rights, veto rights or board seats
(Cumming, 2002). Due to the complexity of contracts between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs, the investment environment of the country needs to be well-regulated,
reliably safe and stable. Assuming that a safe and well-regulated investment profile
will encourage more venture capitalists to engage in funding deals with entrepreneurs,
the investment profile index is supposed to be positively correlated with early-stage
VC investments (Hypothesis 2.4).
3.3 Cultural Influences on Venture Capital
Investments
Although the related literature has found that economic and institutional factors
influencing the level of entrepreneurship and hence the demand for VC investments
are very important, one can still find a high level of unexplained variation across
countries. Therefore, the empirical literature on entrepreneurship tries to explain this
variation by including cultural factors in the investigation (Hofstede et al., 2004).
With the assumption of an “entrepreneurial spirit”, Max Weber, along with economists
from the Austrian and German schools, represent crucial early contributors to the
literature of entrepreneurship, taking cultural differences across nations into account
(Max Weber, 1904 cited in Thomas and Mueller, 2000). Underlining the society’s
acceptance of the Protestant work ethic, Weber (1904) claimed that cultural and
religious factors could explain differences in entrepreneurial activity.
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The Puritan aspects of the Calvinist moral code, emphasizing personal responsibility
for one’s actions and interpreting success as a sign of grace, caused people to aim
for profit, which in turn led to wealth accumulation through reinvestment of profit
(Thomas and Mueller, 2000; Hofstede et al., 2004). On the basis of Weber’s work
ethic thesis, McClelland (1961) cited in Thomas and Mueller (2000) argued that
an entrepreneurial tendency is created by aspiring success, often determined by
parental education or other socialization factors. Societies that emphasize values like
achievement, recognition, and competition (masculine values) would also show greater
levels of entrepreneurship than societies that rather value relationships and quality of
life (feminine values) (ibid.). Etzioni (1987) cited in Hofstede et al. (2004) thinks that
diverging values and beliefs in a society and hence among potential entrepreneurs
explain the variation in entrepreneurial activity across countries.
Research on the relationship between culture and entrepreneurship refers to the four
indices of Hofstede (1980) as a measure of culture which will also be included in this
study. For Hofstede (1980, p. 25), culture is “the collective programming of the mind
which distinguishes the members of one human group from another and includes
systems and values”. People develop and strengthen “mental programs” through their
experiences. These behavior patterns that are “programmed” into the individuals
of society are consistent with national culture (Hofstede, 1980 cited in Pheng and
Yuquan, 2002; Hofstede et al., 2004).
Having analyzed data from more than 40 countries, Hofstede (1980) finds four
underlying value dimensions in these mental programs that can classify countries into
different cultural areas: Individualism, power distance, masculinity and uncertainty
avoidance. Representing fundamental elements of common structure in various
cultures, these four dimensions offer an important framework for investigating the
effects of cultural differences on management and organizations (Pheng and Yuquan,
2002).
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Using Hofstede’s (1980) indices, Shane (1992) examined the relationship between
culture and the level of inventions in a society and finds that cultures with less
power distance and high individualism are more inventive than others. These cultural
characteristics can be found in the United States, Norway, Ireland, or the Netherlands.
A year later, Shane (1993) investigates the effect of culture on innovation rates which
he measures with the per capita number of trademarks. In that analysis, he concludes
that the level of innovations is negatively correlated with the occurrence of uncertainty
avoidance (Hofstede et al., 2004). Acs et al. (1994) examine the correlation of culture
and self-employment. Contrary to Shane (1992, 1993), they come to the conclusion
that higher uncertainty avoidance and lower individualism lead to higher levels of
self-employment.
Reviewing the existing literature on culture and entrepreneurship using Hofstede’s
(1980) indices, there appear to be several contradicting hypotheses. According to Shane
(1992; 1993), lower power distance, lower uncertainty avoidance, higher masculinity
and higher individualism stimulate entrepreneurship. This approach, namely the
“aggregate psychological traits approach”, underlines that the more people that carry
entrepreneurial values (such as the aim for autonomy, competition and success) are in
a society, the more there will be entrepreneurial activity (Shane, 1993). These values
therefore serve as “pull factors” that account for individuals to choose self-employment,
fulfilling their expectation to be better off as entrepreneurs (Wennekers, 2006). A
second approach refers to the “moral approval” of entrepreneurship within a society,
which is manifested through more encouragement of and attention to entrepreneurship
within the educational system, more tax incentives to support start-ups, as well as a
higher social status of entrepreneurs (Etzioni, 1987; Freytag and Thurik, 2007). These
social norms and institutions favoring the role of the entrepreneur at a society-level
result in higher demand for and supply of entrepreneurship (Etzioni, 1987 cited in
Uhlaner and Thurik, 2007).
In contrast to that, the findings of Baum et al. (1993) suggest that organizations in
countries with higher power distance, higher uncertainty avoidance, lower masculinity
and lower individualism would increase entrepreneurial activity.
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Countries with higher uncertainty avoidance among the population tend to have
organizations that do not satisfy the needs of an entrepreneurial personality. While
being dissatisfied in mainstream organizations and pursuing more autonomy, poten-
tial entrepreneurs are more likely self-employed. Thus, dissatisfaction of would-be
entrepreneurs in corporate organizations serves as a “push factor” to entrepreneurial
activity in these countries (also named as the “dissatisfaction approach”) (Hofstede et
al., 2004; Wennekers, 2006; Etzioni, 1987; Noorderhaven et al., 2004). Starting from
the assumption that different levels of entrepreneurial activity are the consequence of
disparities in values and beliefs of potential entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in a
society, it is the clash of values between these two groups that pushes the potential
entrepreneurs away from the mainstream organization and into self-employment
(Baum et al., 1993 cited in Freytag and Thurik, 2007).
The results of Acs et al. (1994) (higher uncertainty avoidance and lower individualism)
confirm this “dissatisfaction approach” and explain the differences in self-employment
across cultures (Hofstede et al., 2004).
Consistent with past literature, especially Shane (1992; 1993), individualism is
assumed to be positively related to early-stage VC investments in this study (Hypothesis
3.1.). In a culture where people perceive themselves as independent and where
autonomy is considered as an ideal, entrepreneurs are more likely to emerge and
hence more VC investments will be demanded (Abraham, 2009).
Additionally, Morris et al. (1994) cited in Beugelsdijk (2007) showed that entrepreneur-
ship decreases the more collectivism (hence the less individualism) is emphasized
in a society. In cultures in which group-thinking offsets individual initiatives, few
potential entrepreneurs would actually follow their ambition and start a business
(ibid.).
As countries with a high score on power distance value centralized decision structures
and more concentration of authority, people might be more averse to starting their own
business since this would imply the loss of being directed by authoritative leadership
(Abraham, 2009). Leading to a lower level of entrepreneurial activity and hence to
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fewer VC investments, power distance is expected to have a negative relationship with
early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 3.2.).
More masculine cultures put emphasis on values like achievement, competition, success,
and advancement (Abraham, 2009). According to McClelland (1961), an important
characteristic of an entrepreneur is a desire and drive for success. Schumpeter (1912)
described the entrepreneur as being highly stimulated by the joy of creation and
the pleasure of success as well as to be eager to show his superiority to others (see
chapter 2). Entrepreneurial activity and therefore the demand for VC investments is
assumed to be higher in more masculine cultures (Shane, 1992; 1993); thus, masculinity
should be positively related to early-stage VC investments (Hypothesis 3.3.).
Starting a new company involves a high level of risk for the entrepreneur. That
is why entrepreneurs are commonly pictured as being able to effectively deal with
uncertain, vague, and unclear situations (Scheré, 1982 cited in Freytag and Thurik,
2010). As discussed in chapter 2, Knight (1921) sees one of the most important
functions of the entrepreneur in bearing risk and underlines that entrepreneurs are
best at coping with uncertainty. Similarly, investing in a young business also bears
a lot of uncertainty about the return on investment. A society that fears unknown
situations will most likely not produce many entrepreneurs. Thus, venture capitalists
in a highly uncertainty- and therefore risk-averse society will invest less in start-ups
since they cannot be sure whether their investments will actually pay off in the end
(Shane 1992; 1993). Consequently, in accordance with Shane (1992; 1993), countries
with higher uncertainty avoidance will have a lower level of early-stage VC investments
(Hypothesis 3.4).
Table 3.1. provides an overview of all the discussed hypotheses to be tested.
In summary, this analysis extends previous research by identifying economic, insti-
tutional, and cultural factors that affect the level of VC investments. The eventual
findings can help by providing additional information to decision makers and ad-
vice for policy makers looking to develop their venture capital markets in order to
encourage innovation and foster entrepreneurship.
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Table 3.1: Hypotheses to be tested
Hypotheses linking Economic Variables and the level of VC Investments
Hypothesis 1.1. A positive relationship between GDP growth and early-stage Ven-
ture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 1.2. A positive relationship between openness and early-stage Venture
Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 1.3. A negative relationship between unemployment and early-stage
Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 1.4. A positive relationship between R&D expenditures and early-stage
Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 1.5 A positive relationship between the NASDAQ Index and early-
stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypotheses linking Institutional Variables and the level of VC Investments
Hypothesis 2.1. A positive relationship between government stability and early-
stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 2.2. A positive relationship between socioeconomic conditions and early-
stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 2.3. A positive relationship between the bureaucracy quality and early-
stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 2.4 A positive relationship between the investment profile and early-
stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypotheses linking Cultural Variables and the level of VC Investments
Hypothesis 3.1. A positive relationship between individualism and early-stage Ven-
ture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 3.2. A negative relationship between power distance and early-stage
Venture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 3.3. A positive relationship between masculinity and early-stage Ven-
ture Capital investments is predicted.
Hypothesis 3.4 A negative relationship between the uncertainty avoidance and
early-stage Venture Capital investments is predicted.
4 Methodology
4.1 Data
In order to test the central hypotheses about the impacts of economical, institutional
and cultural variables on the level of VC investments and hence the entrepreneurial
activity in a country, this study refers to the European Private Equity and Venture
Capital Association (EVCA) for European data as well as to the National Venture
Capital Association (NVCA) for US data. As used in this research paper, the level
of entrepreneurial activity is measured by the sum of the annual VC investments
at the early stage, presented as a share of GDP (gross domestic product at market
prices). Early-stage VC investments are defined as the sum of seed and start-up VC
investments. For the period under study, 1995-2013, the data are available for 16
countries (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: The 16 countries studied in this research (in alphabetical order) with their
OECD abbreviations
Austria AUT France FRA Italy ITA Spain ESP
Belgium BEL Germany DEU Netherlands NLD Sweden SWE
Denmark DNK Greece GRC Norway NOR United Kingdom GBR
Finland FIN Ireland IRL Portugal PRT United States USA
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The economic variables used to predict the level of entrepreneurial activity in this
study include GDP growth, openness, the unemployment rate, R&D expenditures, and
the NASDAQ Composite Index. These variables are available for the 16 countries
listed in Table 4.1 in the underlying period from 1995-2013. The main sources include
the World Development Indicators from the World Bank and national accounts data
for GDP growth and openness; Key Indicators of the Labor Market database by the
International Labor Organization and OECD National Accounts data files for the
unemployment rate; the UNESCO Institute for Statistics for the R&D expenditures
and the Yahoo! Finance database for the NASDAQ Composite Index.
The institutional variables that are expected to explain the level of VC funds are
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, bureaucracy quality and the investment
profile. These institutional variables are derived from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) and are part of the political risk rating. Points are assigned by ICRG
editors on the basis of a series of pre-set questions for each risk component.
Measures for the cultural variables are derived from Hofstede et al. (2010). IBM
collected the original data in the period from 1967 to 1973. In Hofstede’s work since
2001, and notably in the third edition of his work from 2010, scores are recorded for
76 countries and regions. Scores were available for all the 14 countries used in this
study. Since culture supposedly changes slowly over time, the scores can be regarded
as up to date. The authors confirm that the scores have been proven to be relatively
stable over time. The data is obtained from Geert Hofstede’s website 1.
1www.geert-hofstede.com
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4.2 Definition of Variables
To examine the bivariate relationships between economic indicators and the level of
early-stage VC investments (as a share of GDP), the economic variables are defined
as follows: GDP growth gives the annual growth rate of GDP at market prices based
on constant local currency; openness represents the sum of exports and imports of
goods and services measured as a share of GDP; unemployment rate is the share
of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment;
R&D expenditures are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on
creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge
of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications,
measured as a share of GDP, and the NASDAQ Composite Index is the NASDAQ
Index at the end of each investment year, adjusted for dividends and splits.
The institutional variables include: Government stability, which is an assessment
both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, and its abil-
ity to stay in office. As subcomponents, it includes government unity, legislative
strength, and popular support. Socioeconomic conditions is an assessment of the
socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or
fuel social dissatisfaction. Unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty are its
subcomponents. The rating of bureaucracy quality assesses the institutional strength
and ability of the bureaucracy to act as a shock absorber that tends to minimize
revisions of policy when governments change. High points are given to countries
where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries,
the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to
have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack
the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change
in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day
administrative functions. The investment profile is an assessment of factors affecting
the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and financial
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risk components. Its subcomponents are contract viability/expropriation, profits
repatriation, and payment delays.
The indices can reach a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points.
For the government stability, the socioeconomic conditions, and the investment profile,
the risk rating assigned is the sum of the three subcomponents. A score of 4 points
equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk.
For a measure of culture, the study includes Hofstede’s (2001) indices on individualism,
masculinity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance, all taken in log. According
to Hofstede (2001), individualism represents the degree of interdependence a society
maintains among its members. The index is computed based on the standardized
scores of the 15 work goal questions shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Work Goal Questions for the Individualism Index Calculation
Source: Pheng and Yuquan, 2002, p. 12.
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Hofstede (2001) found that almost one-half of the variance in country mean scores on
the 15 questions could be accounted for by just two factors that he called “individual-
collective” and “masculinity-femininity”. The “individual-collective” is mainly com-
posed of the work goals: personal time, freedom, challenge, use of skills, physical con-
ditions and training whereas the country factor scores on the “masculinity-femininity”
factor include the work goals: manager, cooperation, desirable area, employment
security, challenge, advancement, recognition, and earnings (Hofstede, 1980 cited in
Pheng and Yuquan, 2002).
Therefore, masculinity represents the extent of roles division between sexes to which
people in a society put different emphasis on success and assertiveness (masculine) as
opposed to relationships and quality of life (feminine) (Hofstede, 2001).
Hofstede (2001) defines power distance as the extent to which the less powerful
members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that
power is distributed unequally. For example, in cultures with low degrees of power
distance (such as in Ireland, Sweden or Norway), people relate to each other more
as equals regardless of the position they hold in their professional lives. Contrary
to that, people in large power distance countries (such as in France, Spain or Italy)
accept the power of their fellow men solely based on hierarchical positions (Nahata,
Hazarika and Tandon, 2013).
The index is calculated on the basis of the country mean scores for the following
questions:
1. Non-managerial employee’s perception that employees are afraid to disagree with
their managers.
2. Subordinates’ preferences perception that their boss tends to take decisions in an
autocratic (1) or persuasive/paternalistic (2) way.
3. Subordinates’ preference for anything but a consultative (3) style of decision-
making in their boss: that is for an autocratic (1), a persuasive/paternalistic (2) or a
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democratic (4) style (Hofstede, 1980 cited in Pheng and Yuquan, 2002, p. 10).2
Finally, the index on uncertainty avoidance gives the extent to which the members of
a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs
and institutions that try to avoid these. In countries with a high degree of uncertainty
avoidance (such as in France, Spain or Italy), individuals “look for structure in their
organizations, institutions and relationships, which makes events clearly interpretable
and predictable” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 148).
The index is calculated on the basis of the country mean scores for the following
questions:
1. Rule Orientation. Agreement with the statement “Company rules should not be
broken - even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest”.
2. Employment stability. Employee’s statement that they intend to continue with
the company (1) for two years at most, (2) from two to five years.
3. Stress. As expressed in the mean answer to the question “How often do you feel
nervous or tense at work?” (Hofstede, 1980 cited in Pheng and Yuquan, 2002, p. 11).3
Table 4.2 summarizes the definitions of all the variables used in this paper as well as
their sources.
2The formula used is: Power Distance Index = 135 – 25 x (mean score employ afraid) + (% perceived
manager 1 + 2) – (% preferred manager 3) (Hofstede, 1980 cited in Pheng and Yuquan, 2002, p.
10). Hofstede (2001) uses mean scores on a five point scale (1 = very frequently, 5 = very seldom)
for question (1) and percentage values for questions (2) and (3).
3The formula used is: Uncertainty Avoidance Index = 300 – 30 x (mean score rule orientation) –
(%intending to stay less than five years) – 40 x (mean stress score) (Hofstede, 1980 cited in Pheng
and Yuquan, 2002, p. 11).
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Table 4.2: Summary of Variable Definitions and Sources
Dependent Variable
Variable Name Description Sources
Early-stage Venture Capital
Investments
Venture capital investment
is defined as private eq-
uity raised for investment
in companies; management
buyouts, management buy-
ins and venture purchase of
quoted shares are excluded.
Early-stage VC investments
are the sum of seed and start-
up risk capital. The variable
is scaled by gross domestic
product at market prices.
European Private Equity
and Venture Capital Associ-
ation (EVCA), Eurostat;
National Venture Capital As-
sociation (NVCA),
Thomson ONE.com (Ventur-
eXpert database), Thomson
Reuters.
Economic Variables
GDP Growth Annual growth rate of GDP
at market prices based on
constant local currency. Ag-
gregates are based on con-
stant 2005 U.S. dollars.
World Bank national ac-
counts data, OECD National
Accounts data files;
World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
Openness Sum of exports and imports
of goods and services mea-
sured as a share of gross do-
mestic product.
World Bank national ac-
counts data, OECD National
Accounts data files;
World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
Unemployment Rate Share of the labor force that
is without work but available
for and seeking employment.
International Labor Organi-
zation, Key Indicators of the
Labor Market database;
World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
R&D Expenditures Expenditures for research
and development are cur-
rent and capital expendi-
tures (both public and pri-
vate) on creative work un-
dertaken systematically to in-
crease knowledge, including
knowledge of humanity, cul-
ture, and society, and the use
of knowledge for new appli-
cations, measured as a share
of gross domestic product.
United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO) Insti-
tute for Statistics;
World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators.
NASDAQ Composite Index NASDAQ Composite Index
at the end of each year and
adjusted for dividends and
splits. Includes all domes-
tic and international based
common type stocks listed on
The NASDAQ Stock Market.
Yahoo! Finance database.
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Table 4.2. continued
Institutional Variables
Government Stability Assessment of the govern-
ment’s ability to carry out
its declared programs, and
its ability to stay in of-
fice. Subcomponents: gov-
ernment unity, legislative
strength, popular support.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), political risk
taking.
Socioeconomic Conditions Assessment of the socioeco-
nomic pressures that could
constrain government action
or fuel social dissatisfaction.
Subcomponents: unemploy-
ment, consumer confidence,
poverty.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), political risk
taking.
Bureaucracy Quality Assessment of the institu-
tional strength and ability of
bureaucracy to act as a shock
absorber when governments
change.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), political risk
taking.
Investment Profile Assessment of factors affect-
ing the risk to investment
that are not covered by other
political, economic and finan-
cial risk components. Sub-
components: contract vi-
ability/expropriation, prof-
its repatriation, payment de-
lays.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), political risk
taking.
Cultural Variables
Individualism Degree of interdependence a
society maintains among its
members.
Geert Hofstede (2001).
Power Distance Extent to which the less
powerful members of orga-
nizations expect and accept
that power is distributed un-
equally.
Geert Hofstede (2001).
Masculinity Extent of roles division be-
tween sexes to which peo-
ple put different emphasis
on success and assertiveness
(masculine) as opposed to re-
lationships and quality of life
(feminine).
Geert Hofstede (2001).
Uncertainty Avoidance Extent to which the mem-
bers of a culture feel threat-
ened by unknown situations
and have created beliefs and
institutions that try to avoid
these.
Geert Hofstede (2001).
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4.3 Data Analysis
The data analysis consists of two parts. First, descriptive statistics for the level of early-
stage VC investments by country are presented during the 1995-2013 time period.
Second, the hypotheses for bivariate relationships between the various economic,
institutional, and cultural indicators and the level of early-stage VC funds are tested
and results presented. The effects of economic variables on early-stage investments
are considered in different specifications. It has been controlled for fixed effects as
well as for a trend in every regression analysis.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
To get a better idea of the differences between countries in their early-stage VC
investments and hence their entrepreneurial activity, Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the
development of the early-stage VC investments of European countries and the United
States in the period from 1995-2013.
In many countries the level of early-stage VC investments shows a rather cyclical
development during the underlying time period. Continuously increasing from the
beginning of the period and reaching its summit in 2000 with 1,742.56 USD million,
the UK’s early-stage VC investments show a constant decline during the early 2000s.
They could catch up again in 2003 and recover remarkably from 906.15 in 2005 to
4,582.17 USD million in 2006, while drastically decreasing again during the years of
the financial crisis to 319.28 USD million in 2010. Similarly, the VC investments in
France rise significantly during the dot-com boom to 1,249.28 USD million in 2000,
decrease then radically up until 2004, begin to recover in the following years and
decline again in 2007 to 419.72 USD million. Towards the end of the period, they
keep rising and falling to 364.02 USD million in 2012, and could slightly increase to
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Figure 4.2: Early-stage VC Investments in Europe per Country from 1995-2013
Early-stage VC Investments as a share of GDP.
Author’s calculations using data from Eurostat.
428.8 USD million in 2013. Germany’s VC investments also significantly increase in
the beginning of the period up until 2000 to 1,786 USD million, decrease very much
in the years after but increase again in 2007 to 426.55 USD million, and could also
increase slightly towards the end of the period.
Although showing a significantly higher level of early-stage VC investments in com-
parison to the European countries under study (see Figure 4.3), the VC investments
in the United States also show a radical increase in 2000 (from 11,480.6 in 1999 to
25,292.6 USD million in 2000) followed by a large drop from 2001 until 2003. In the
years up until the financial crisis, VC investments keep constantly increasing towards
6,087.3 US million in 2007, whereas they show a rather cyclical development after
2007 until the end of the period, arriving at 9,896.0 USD million in 2013.
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Figure 4.3: Early-stage VC Investments in Europe and the US from 1995-2013
Early-stage VC Investments in millions of current US Dollars.
Author’s calculations using data from Eurostat.
Table 4.3 describes all the variables that are used in the regression analysis.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 1995-2013
Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
VC Investments Early-stage/GDP (in %) 304 0.027 0.030 0 0.268
Economic Variables
GDP Growth (in %) 304 1.972 2.690 −8.864 10.778
Openness (in %) 304 78.159 36.170 22.150 190.782
Unemployment Rate (in %) 288 7.765 3.806 2.1 25
R&D Expenditures (in %) 257 1.984 0.819 0.456 4.13
NASDAQ Index 304 2299.16 807.93 1052.13 4176.59
Institutional Variables
Government Stability 272 8.489 1.393 4.25 11.083
Socioeconomic Conditions 272 8.436 1.420 5 11
Bureaucracy Quality 272 3.709 0.475 2.5 4
Investment Profile 272 10.363 1.867 5.333 12
Cultural Variables
Individualism 304 66.5 16.806 27 91
Power Distance 304 41.438 16.663 11 68
Masculinity 304 44.188 23.804 5 79
Uncertainty Avoidance 304 62.813 24.762 23 100
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4.4.2 Economic Variables and the Level of Venture Capital
Investments
Table 4.4 shows the results of a regression of the five economic variables on early-stage
VC funds for the full set of 16 countries.
When regressing the economic variables one by one on early-stage VC investments, it
is noticeable that GDP growth is positively correlated with early-stage VC investments
(as predicted in Hypothesis 1.1.) when the variables openness, unemployment rate,
and R&D expenditures are included in the regression. Even though not significant, it
shows a negative correlation as soon as the NASDAQ Composite Index is added.
Of these five economic variables, openness, unemployment rate, R&D expenditures,
and the NASDAQ Index correlate significantly with early-stage VC investments. In
this analysis, GDP growth is not significant for the period under study.
Reviewing the results from this section, the following can be concluded: First, there
is no support for the positive relation between GDP growth and the level of VC
investments. Thus, Hypothesis 1.1. is not supported, at least for this initial series of
analyses. Second, there does appear to be a positive correlation between openness
and early-stage VC investments, supporting Hypothesis 1.2. A country that is more
open to trade will experience a faster access to new technology and hence business
opportunities that demand early-stage venture capital. Third, there also is support
for Hypothesis 1.3., indicating a negative relationship between the unemployment rate
and VC investments. This result emphasizes the view of unemployment as a sign for
economic decline and consequently leading to a decrease in entrepreneurial activity,
as a recession hinders opportunities for businesses. Moreover, there does appear to
be support for a positive correlation between R&D expenditures and early-stage VC
investments (Hypothesis 1.4.), showing that a higher technological and innovation
capacity in a country encourages early-stage VC investments.
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Finally, Hypothesis 1.5 finds also support in this regression analysis, indicating that
a higher value in the NASDAQ Composite Index as a proxy for general stock market
conditions results in more early-stage VC investments.
Table 4.4: Regression of Economic Variables on VC Investments at the Early Stage
Dependent Variable
VC Investments Early Stage / GDP
Economic Variables
GDP Growth 0.00082* 0.00013 0.00038 −0.00063
(0.00048) (0.00050) (0.00056) (0.00056)
Openness 0.00051** 0.00055** 0.00043* 0.00046**
(0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00024) (0.00022)
Unemployment Rate . −0.00214*** −0.00180*** −0.00215***
(0.00049) (0.00053) (0.00052)
R&D Expenditures . . 0.02895*** 0.02696***
(0.00786) (0.00714)
NASDAQ Index . . . 0.02662***
(0.00699)
Constant 0.05653*** 0.07127*** 0.01047 −0.17691***
(0.01328) (0.01550) (0.01832) (0.05005)
Observations 304 288 257 257
R2 0.301 0.322 0.358 0.404
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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4.4.3 Institutional Variables and the Level of Venture Capital
Investments
In the second part of this analysis, institutional variables are added to the regression
of economic variables on early-stage VC investments. Of these four institutional
variables, only the socioeconomic conditions correlate significantly with the level of VC
investments and show a positive relationship. Entrepreneur-friendly macro-economic
policies like lower income tax rates and a more flexible labor market legislation result
in favorable socioeconomic conditions for both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
Therefore, the risk of starting one’s own company will be reduced, which will increase
the demand for venture capital.
Adding the institutional variables to the regression changes the correlation of the
economic variable unemployment rate with VC investments. Unemployment rate
is no longer negatively correlated with VC investments (hence no longer supports
Hypothesis 1.3.), but shows an inverse relationship. Moreover, unemployment rate is
no longer significant. Table 4.5 shows the results of this second part of the regression
analysis.
The results of the regression including the institutional variables support Hypothesis
2.1. and 2.2. linking institutional factors with early-stage VC investments. The
positive relationship found between government stability and the level of early-stage
VC investments is consistent with Hypothesis 2.1. Yet, government stability is
insignificant. Further, the direction of Hypothesis 2.2. is also supported, indicating
that a higher score in the socioeconomic conditions leads to more early-stage VC
investments: Socioeconomic conditions that reduce the risk for business ownership
and investment will result in more start-ups that request VC financing.
Finally, there is no support for Hypothesis 2.3. and 2.4. The correlation between
bureaucracy quality as well as investment profile and early-stage VC investments is
negative, but neither is significant. Only the socioeconomic conditions variable is
significant in the same direction to that predicted.
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4.4.4 Cultural Variables and the Level of Venture Capital
Investments
This section presents the results of the bivariate analyses of cultural variables and
VC investments, including the economic and institutional variables in the regression.
See Table 4.5 for the results of this analysis. In reviewing the results of Table 4.5, three
out of four cultural indices significantly correlate with the level of VC investments;
they are power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. The correlation and
significance levels of the economic and institutional variables do not change when the
cultural variables are included in the regression.
The results reported in this section, including all the cultural indices in the regression
of institutional and economic variables, do not confirm Hypothesis 3.1.: Although
not significant, the correlation between individualism and early-stage VC investments
turns out to be negative.
Moreover, there is no support for Hypothesis 3.2. In fact, the regression analysis finds
a positive relationship between power distance and the level of early-stage VC invest-
ments. Countries where centralized decision structures and a higher concentration of
authority are valued more seem to produce a higher amount of entrepreneurs that
demand venture capital. Although seeming counter-intuitive, this result is consistent
with the conclusions of Baum et al. (1993), finding that higher power distance leads to
a higher level of entrepreneurial activity in a country (and hence to a higher demand
of VC investments).
The restrictive climate prevalent in large companies and organizations of countries with
high concentration of authority incentivizes potential entrepreneurs to obtain more
autonomy by self-employment (the so-called "dissatisfaction approach") (Wennekers
et al., 2007). High power distance countries might show more dissatisfaction in life in
general which pushes more individuals into self-employment (Baum et al., 1993).
The positive effect of masculinity on VC investments found in the regression analysis
is consistent with Hypothesis 3.3. As more masculine cultures promote values like
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achievement, competition, and success, these cultures are likely to produce more
entrepreneurs who then demand VC funding (Hofstede, 1980).
Finally, this study also finds support for Hypothesis 3.4, indicating that uncertainty
avoidance is negatively associated with VC investments. A society that fears unknown
situations will most likely not bring about a high level of entrepreneurs since starting
one’s own company involves a high level of risk. Likewise, risk-averse venture
capitalists will be less likely to invest in start-ups since they cannot be sure whether
their investment will pay off in the end (Shane, 1992; 1993).
Comparing the residuals of the United States and Europe in Table 4.6, the study finds
that the mean residual for the US is approximately six times larger than the mean
residual for Europe. Therefore, the explanatory variables of the regression better
explain the European early-stage VC investments whereas there must be some other
unexplainable factors that influence the early-stage VC investments in the United
States.
Including a US country dummy in the regression reveals that early-stage VC invest-
ments in the US are by 0.05% larger than in the European countries after controlling
for the explanatory variables (see Table 4.7). It also has to be noted that the cultural
variables are not significant anymore in explaining the difference in early-stage VC
investments between the United States and Europe whereas they still seem to matter
when comparing among European countries. After unobservable factors have been
controlled for, the difference in early-stage VC investments between the US and Eu-
rope seems to be better captured in the characteristics of their respective institutions
rather than in their cultural differences.
Table 4.6: Residuals
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
US 16 2.33e−10 0.047 −0.026 0.163
Europe 225 3.90e−11 0.021 −0.064 0.177
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Table 4.5: Regression of Economic, Institutional and Cultural Variables on VC Investments
at the Early Stage
Dependent Variable
VC Investments Early Stage / GDP
Economic Variables
GDP Growth −0.00063 −0.00053 −0.00053
(0.00056) (0.00053) (0.00053)
Openness 0.00046** 0.00039* 0.00039*
(0.00022) (0.00024) (0.00024)
Unemployment Rate −0.00215*** 0.00044 0.00044
(0.00052) (0.00103) (0.00103)
R&D Expenditures 0.02696*** 0.02269*** 0.02269***
(0.00714) (0.00704) (0.00704)
NASDAQ Index 0.02662*** 0.02493*** 0.02493***
(0.00699) (0.00662) (0.00662)
Institutional Variables
Government Stability . 0.00176 0.00176
(0.00177) (0.00177)
Socioeconomic Conditions . 0.01020** 0.01020**
(0.00417) (0.00417)
Bureaucracy Quality . −0.00496 −0.00496
(0.00756) (0.00756)
Investment Profile . −0.00123 −0.00123
(0.00182) (0.00182)
Cultural Variables
Individualism . . −0.01371
(0.01955)
Power Distance . . 0.41194**
(0.18674)
Masculinity . . 0.05700**
(0.02460)
Uncertainty Avoidance . . −0.24892**
(0.12339)
Constant −0.17691*** −0.24071*** 0.98069***
(0.05005) (0.05561) (0.34422)
Observations 257 241 241
R2 0.404 0.455 0.455
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Regression of Economic, Institutional and Cultural Variables on VC Investments
at the Early Stage, including a US Country Dummy
Dependent Variable
VC Investments Early Stage / GDP
Economic Variables
GDP Growth −0.00053
(0.00053)
Openness 0.00039*
(0.00024)
Unemployment Rate 0.00044
(0.00103)
R&D Expenditures 0.02269***
(0.00704)
NASDAQ Index 0.02493***
(0.00662)
Institutional Variables
Government Stability 0.00176
(0.00177)
Socioeconomic Conditions 0.01020**
(0.00417)
Bureaucracy Quality −0.00496
(0.00756)
Investment Profile −0.00123
(0.00182)
Cultural Variables
Individualism 0.01072
(0.01993)
Power Distance 0.04235
(0.04458)
Masculinity 0.01242
(0.01128)
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.02803
(0.04760)
US Dummy 0.04561*
(0.02590)
Constant −0.64944***
(0.22495)
Observations 241
R2 0.455
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
5 The Importance of the Angel
Investment Market
Angel investment is a very important part of outside equity financing and represents
an essential support for start-ups, especially at the early stage (OECD, 2011). Initial
business angel investment fosters innovative entrepreneurial growth, future venture
capital investment, wealth creation, as well as regional economic development (Lipper
and Sommer, 2002). Therefore, individual business angels not only supported the
creation of Silicon Valley through their funding of promising start-ups, but also played
an essential role in building up the formal venture capital industry (Ibrahim, 2010).
A business angel is defined as an “individual investor that invests directly her own
money predominantly in seed or start-up companies with no family relationships.
Business angels make their own final investment decisions and are financially indepen-
dent, i.e. a possible total loss of their business angel investments will not significantly
change the economic situation of their assets” (EBAN, 2014a).
Angel investment is often overlooked, as angel investors are not always visible. Due
to the recent financial crisis and the difficult economic situation worldwide, angel
investors were filling financing gaps left by banks and VC firms (OECD, 2011). The
equity financing gap between individual angel investment and venture capital is in the
500,000 to 3 million USD range in the United States (EBAN, 2010 cited in OECD,
2011). Fewer venture capitalists invest at the early stage, so that the equity funding
gap between individual angel investment and venture capital has grown radically
(OECD, 2011).
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By investing with other angel investors through groups and syndicates, or even by
co-investing in seed and/or venture funds, angel investors could increase the total
deal size for start-ups seeking early-stage financing, and hence aimed to fill this gap.
Therefore, it was actually angel financing that was the primary source of external seed
and early-stage equity financing in many countries and not venture capital. Apart
from that, investment by business angels creates a signaling effect for other investors,
showing that these start-ups have succeeded a first screening of due diligence by
experienced investors. As angel investors most often invest locally and in a wider
range of innovation than VC firms, angel investment has much broader investment
coverage both in terms of industry sectors and geography. Angels can therefore live
anywhere and are not obliged to settle down in a few technology and science hubs in
order to ensure a steady deal flow as venture capitalists do (OECD, 2011).
In addition to the financial support, angel investors also provide strategic and
operational expertise for new ventures as well as a strong network of personal
relationships (Harrison and Mason, 2010; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998 cited in OECD,
2011).
VC firms raise and invest money from institutional investors in exchange for a
management fee as well as a share of the companies’ profits; therefore they are
motivated to raise the largest amount of funds possible and generate sufficient returns
for their institutional investors and themselves. Angel investors, however, are satisfied
with smaller exits (Sahlman and Richardson, 2010 cited in OECD, 2011).
Angels most often invest at early stages because they lose their advantages as value-
added investors with the growth of the start-up. In the early stages, angels can
offer experienced advice on initial growth strategies and assistance on getting future
funding whereas at the later stages, private venture capitalists have the comparative
advantage in giving advice about the most profitable exit strategy and in using their
network to recruit professional managers for the growing company (Ibrahim, 2010).
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However, there are exceptions: angel financing alone can be sufficient for software
and internet companies to reach exit because the development costs are relatively
low. In life sciences and clean tech fields the costs are significantly higher, so that
VC becomes necessary (Ibrahim, 2010).
Business angel activity is estimated to be much higher in the United States than
in Europe. Estimates from both the United States and the UK show that angel
investment has been constantly larger than seed and early-stage venture capital
investment despite some decrease following the dot-com bust in the late 1990s and
during the recent financial crisis. While methods of estimating the full angel market
size differ, many studies over the past decade have recognized that total angel
investment is much greater than overall VC investment, not only in the United States
but also in some European countries (OECD, 2011).
Angel investors typically acquire between 10-20% of the ownership share of the start-
ups in which they invest (Wiltbank, 2009 cited in OECD, 2011). Venture capitalists
usually request a larger share of companies as well as control rights. Angel investors
often wish to remain minority shareholders as they know that the entrepreneur will
need to receive further funding in order to make the company bigger (OECD, 2011).
Since most business angels do not easily find sufficient investment opportunities, the
nature of the angel market is very fragmented and angels are most often invisible.
Consequently, search costs for both entrepreneurs and angels were high as they tried
to find each other (Mason, 2009). Through the creation of angel groups and networks
in many countries around the world, the angel investment sector is becoming more
formalized and organized (Ibrahim, 2008 cited in OECD, 2011). The development of
angel groups/networks in the United States and Europe is presented in Figure 5.1.
Business angel networks try to make the investment process more efficient while
connecting angel investors not only with other important actors in the local ecosystem
(such as incubators, venture capitalists, banks, etc.), but most importantly, with
entrepreneurs seeking capital (EC, 2002 cited in OECD, 2011).
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Figure 5.1: Total Number of Angel Groups/Networks in Operation in the US and Europe
from 1999-2009
Note: Based on groups and networks surveyed.
Source: OECD based on ACA (Angel Capital Association) and EBAN (The European
Trade Association for Business Angels, Seed Funds, and other Early Stage Market Players),
OECD (2011), p. 48.
Business angel networks make angel activity in a region visible without giving
individual visibility to angels who prefer to remain anonymous and therefore facilitate
the contact with entrepreneurs seeking financing (OECD, 2011). According to Shane
(2009), the best policy for governments to intervene in the angel capital market is
to encourage the formation of angel groups as these can invest in a more diverse
portfolio at a lower net worth than individual angels.
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5.1 Angel Investment in the United States
In the United States, angel investment increased significantly during the dot-com era
and dramatically dropped when the dot-com bubble exploded. However, in the past
decade, angel investment could grow again with a drop in investment activity during
the financial crisis. The impact of the financial crisis becomes especially evident in
the reduced size but increased number of deals that angel investors were involved
in (see Figure 5.2). Angel investors investing through groups continued to invest
following the financial crisis but at much lower amounts per deal (OECD, 2011).
Figure 5.2: Investments by Business Angel Groups in the US from 2006-2009
Note: Amount invested in USD millions.
Number of deals estimated based on number provided by ACA (Angel Capital Association).
Source: OECD based on ACA (Angel Capital Association); OECD (2011), p. 51.
The idea of angel groups originates from the United States and has considerably
developed in the last decade. Angel groups can be found in nearly every US state,
although the majority of angel investors are in the entrepreneurial centers on the
west and east coast (OECD, 2011).
The first notable angel group, called “Silicon Valley’s Band of Angels”, was founded
in 1994, followed by 150 more angel groups formed in the years after (Ibrahim, 2010).
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The Kauffman Foundation financially supported the creation of the Angel Capital
Association (ACA) in 2004, to which many angel groups belong to, and later the Angel
Resource Institute (ARI), which is the former angel capital education foundation
(ACEF). The ACA consists of 6,760 member angels (Ibrahim, 2010).
The amount of business angel investment conducted in the US in a typical year equals
about USD 23 billion (Shane, 2009). About 50,700 to 57,300 companies receive funds
from business angels in a typical year (ibid.). According to a study conducted for the
ACA, overall returns to angel investment in the US had a factor of 2.6 in 3.5 years
(Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007 cited in OECD, 2011).
The study also revealed that the rate of return improved with (1) increased due
diligence prior to investment, (2) experience of the angel investors, and (3) active
involvement of the angel investor in the company after the investment has taken place
(OECD, 2011).
5.2 Angel Investment in Europe
With support of the European Commission, the European Business Angels Network
(EBAN) was created in 1999 and brought together potential angel investors and
entrepreneurs while serving as a federation of Business Angel Networks (BANs) across
Europe. Many national BANs were created in the following years (OECD, 2011).
Over the past 10 years, the number of business angel networks in Europe increased to
468 in 2013, with estimated amounts invested of EUR 554 million by approximately
28,000 BAN members (EBAN, 2014b cited in Kraemer-Eis et al., 2014). The amounts
invested by business angel networks in Europe from 2006-2009 are presented in Figure
5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Investments by Business Angel Networks in Europe from 2006-2009
Source: OECD based on networks surveyed by EBAN (The European Trade Association for
Business Angels, Seed Funds, and other Early Stage Market Players); OECD (2011), p. 51.
Individual angel investments vary considerably and account for an average investment
per Business Angel of EUR 20,437 in 2013. Recently, the majority of the Business
Angel activity within the EU has been centered on the UK, Spain, France, Germany,
Finland, and Sweden (see Figure 5.4) (EBAN, 2014b cited in Kraemer-Eis et al.,
2014).
Comparing VC investment at the seed stage with the available data of the “visible”
angel market in Europe, the total investment through angel networks has already
exceeded seed VC investment. If the “invisible” angel market is also considered, the
total angel investment in Europe, which was estimated in 2011 to be approximately
EUR 4 billion and in 2014 to be EUR 5,5 billion according to EBAN, significantly
surpasses VC seed and actually matches the amount of all seed-, early- and later-stage
VC investments in Europe (see Figure 5.5) (OECD, 2011; EBAN, 2014b).
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of Angel Investment by Country from 2012-2013
Note: Amount invested in EUR millions.
Source: EBAN, 2014b, p. 6.
The “invisible market” makes a precise estimation of the angel market very difficult.
Studies claimed that the invisible European angel market is actually up to seven
times greater than the visible one, while others estimate a multiplier of around ten
(CSES, 2012; EBAN, 2014b cited in Kraemer-Eis, 2014).
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Figure 5.5: The Three Main Areas of Early-Stage Investment in Europe
Source: EBAN, 2014b, p. 2.
5.2.1 Angels in France
The work of France Angels, a national federation for angel groups across the country,
significantly developed the angel market in France and made it one of the most active
angel markets in Europe. Many kinds of angel networks have established across
France, including numerous university alumni groups (OECD, 2011).
In 2013, there were 82 independent networks linked to the France Angels organization,
with 4292 individual investors registered. However, French business angel network
activity stagnated in 2014 despite of an increase in the number of start-ups looking
for funding, combined with a growing support network of incubators and accelerators.
French angels invested in 4% of the close to 10,000 start-ups that were applying for
funding in 2013, and provided on average EUR 132,000 per business funded (compared
to EUR 114,000 in 2012) (France Angels, 2014).
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The same authors said that from 2005 to 2013, total amounts invested by Business
Angels in France have almost tripled from 16 to 41 million EUR. Angel investors
most often invested in digital services (25%), software/mobile/internet (16%), health
and bio tech (15%) as well as energy and clean tech (11%), services and transports
(9%), industry and chemicals (9%), and consumer goods (7%).
5.2.2 Angels in Germany
With the help of the German government, Germany established a national Business
Angel Network (BAN) as well as local BANs in the late 1990s (OECD, 2011). With 38
BANs, Germany has the second highest number of BANs in Europe after France (with
82 networks linked to the France Angels organization) (Mason, 2009; France Angels,
2014). German Business Angel associations have approximately 1400 registered
members, whereas estimates about the real number of Business Angels in Germany lie
between 2700 and 3400 active Business Angels (Fryges et al., 2007 cited in Kraemer-Eis
and Schillo, 2011).
The annual amount invested by Business Angels in Germany is estimated to be
between 100 and 300 million EUR. German Business Angels invested around EUR
100,000 per start-up (median: EUR 30,000). Since there were only a few tech
companies that received relatively high amounts from German angels, the mean is
high compared to the median. The high-tech sector and tech-oriented services are of
particular investment interest for German angels (Kraemer-Eis and Schillo, 2011).
6 The Development of the Venture
Capital Industries in the United
States and Europe
Venture capital is an important source of funding for new and innovative small firms
which are vital for economic growth and job creation. VC investors can realize returns
from their investments in promising start-ups through trade sales (mergers and
acquisitions) or initial public offerings (IPOs) on stock markets. VC industries differ
considerably across countries and are very sensitive to business cycles, noticeable both
in the amounts invested and in the stages of investment (OECD, 2013a). Venture
capital considerably declined globally during the financial crisis in 2008/09. In
2010, venture capital funding could not yet recover to its pre-crisis level. However,
high growth rates for venture capital in 2011 could be observed in Denmark (+80%),
Hungary (+62%), and the Netherlands (+56%) whereas a strong decline was prevalent
in Portugal (-80%), Switzerland (-37%), Sweden (-25%), and Ireland (-11%) (OECD,
2013b).
In Europe, venture capital markets seem significantly less developed than in the
US, both in terms of the amounts invested and the amount per deal. Prior to the
recent financial crisis, banks were already unwilling to lend to start-ups due to their
perceived high risk and lack of collateral. The financial crisis enlarged the existing
gap at the seed and early stage: bank lending to start-ups declined further and VC
firms became more risk averse due to pressures on the industry and instead invested
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at later stages where risks are lower, leaving gaps at the pre-seed and seed stages.
Furthermore, both trade sales and IPOs decreased significantly in Europe (OECD,
2013a). The development of VC investments from 2007 until 2013 in the US and in
Europe is shown in Figure 6.1 and in Figure 6.2, respectively.
When Britain’s industrial revolution spread to Europe in 1848, there were many
young Europeans who were ambitious and who had access to capital. The majority
of Europe’s big companies, such as ThyssenKrupp, a German steel group; L’Oréal,
the French beauty empire; or A. O. Moller-Maersk group, the Danish shipping giant;
were founded around the turn of the last century. The devastation of the wars made
Europeans more risk averse and markets, which were closely linked before 1914, split
up. Europe listed only three big new firms funded between 1975 and 2007; two started
in Britain and Ireland (The Economist, 2012).
This might be a result of the European institutional and cultural environment for
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that considerably differs from the American
one: Strict labor regulations and high taxes in many European countries hinder
VC investments as they are directly affecting the costs firms face. Employment
protection taxes the labor adjustment margins of companies and hence hinders the
overall development of the high-growth sectors. As VC investors are mainly attracted
to growing and volatile sectors, these adjustment costs strongly discourage VC firms
investing in Europe (Bottazzi et al., 2004).
While pension funds and endowments are the largest institutional investors in VC
funds in the US, banks and corporations own a considerable number of VC firms
in Europe (Bottazzi et al., 2004; Xu, 2004). As banks are assumed to be more risk
averse and conservative, the amount of European VC funds stands significantly below
the US level (Tyabji and Sathe, 2011).
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Figure 6.1: Venture Capital Investments in the US from Q1 2007 - Q1 2013
Note: Trend-cycle average 2007 = 100.
Source: OECD, 2014c, p. 23.
Figure 6.2: Venture Capital Investments in Europe from Q1 2007 - Q1 2013
Note: Trend-cycle average 2007 = 100.
Source: OECD, 2014c, p. 23.
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Further, VC firms in the US performed considerably better than their European
counterparts mainly due to their stronger linkage to the US stock market (Xu, 2004).
The European stock markets are fragmented, small and illiquid which makes the
exit possibilities of VC investments difficult and hence slows down VC funding in
Europe. European stock markets do not have the volume to support analysts and
other professionals who offer services to firms anticipating stock market listing and
to potential stock market investors (European Commission, 2005).
Given the weak public stock market for start-ups in Europe, they most often exit
through a trade sale (merger or acquisition), rather than an IPO (Tyabji and Sathe,
2011). As studies have found that trade sales seem to be less lucrative than IPOs,
this can be one of the reasons why VC firms in Europe cannot keep up with the
performance of their American counterparts (ibid.).
Comparing European VC firms to VC firms in the US more carefully, it has been
observed that European VC firms hold their investments for a longer period of time, use
convertible debt and convertible preferred stock less frequently, replace management
less frequently, invest in their own region more frequently, and co-invest with other
VCs less frequently than the American VC firms. These characteristics may contribute
to the explanation of the weaker performance of European VC funds compared to
American ones: Longer holding periods suppose a certain hesitance of abandoning
unpromising ventures; less use of convertible securities means that venture capitalists
are given up control rights, while a less frequent replacement of management may
imply greater tolerance towards non-performing founders. More frequent investments
in one region may result in the omission of attractive opportunities elsewhere and
less frequent co-investing may indicate that syndication benefits are not fully being
used (Tyabji and Sathe, 2011).
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Besides characteristics of European and American VC firms, barriers to entrepreneur-
ship significantly influence the level of VC investments as they decrease the demand
for VC financing. Figure 6.3 illustrates the degree of barriers to entrepreneurship
across countries: Barriers to entrepreneurship remain comparatively low in the US
whereas some European countries such as Spain, Greece, the Czech Republic, and
France seem to have a more restrictive environment for entrepreneurs.
Figure 6.3: Barriers to Entrepreneurship
Note: Scale from 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive.
Source: OECD, 2014c, p. 87.
In the following, the venture capital industries of the United States and two European
countries, France and Germany, will be examined in more detail. The institutional
and cultural characteristics of the respective countries related to their VC industries
and start-up ecosystems will be presented in order to illuminate the striking difference
between the two continents.
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6.1 The Venture Capital Industry in the United
States and the Silicon Valley Cluster
Over the past two and a half decades, the rate of new business start-ups has been
decreasing in the US (US Department of Commerce, 2012 cited in OECD, 2012a).
The declining access to seed/start-up capital on which innovative entrepreneurial firms
depend may be considered as one factor that presumably contributed to this tendency.
Due to the “dot-com” bust in 2000, and bolstered by the economic downturn of
the past three years, a greater share of venture capital is invested at the later stage
of innovative firms which is less risky than investing at the start-up or seed-stage
(OECD, 2012a).
Venture capital investment in the US mainly focuses on the ICT sector which accounted
for more than 50% of all American VC investments in early 2012. With over USD
20 billion and almost 80% of total VC financing, the VC market reached its summit
with the dot-com bubble in 2000. After the collapse in 2001, VC financing restored
its steady growth that lasted for the next seven years at a moderate rate. During
2008, VC investment began to fall again but started to recover in early 2009, getting
back quickly to the longer-run growth path (see Figure 6.4) (OECD, 2012b).
In the 1980s, innovation and technology were mostly related to large flagship corpora-
tions such as IBM and DEC, representing enormous power through a high number of
engineers and scientists who demonstrated strong loyalty to their employers as a result
of lifetime contracts and a rather paternalistic attitude. The emerging New Economy
of Silicon Valley was a total contrast: people left their companies very quickly to start
either new firms or even entirely new industries. While IBM’s company structure
was very bureaucratic and hierarchical, Silicon Valley flourished from spontaneity,
participation, openness, and a general disregard for hierarchical and regulated struc-
tures. The Managed Economy mostly valued obedience and conformity, whereas for
the Entrepreneurial Economy, creativity, originality, independence, and autonomy
were of utmost importance (Audretsch et al., 2002).
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Figure 6.4: Quarterly VC Investments in the ICT Sector in the US, Q1 1995 - Q1 2012
Source: Based on MoneyTree Survey Report, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012), April,
OECD, 2012b, p. 52.
The endogenous growth of Silicon Valley already began to speed up with the devel-
opment of the semiconductor industry in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. In the
meantime, the Californian VC industry began to emerge, too. Draper, Gaither and
Anderson created the first Californian VC firm in 1958 (Ferrary and Granovetter,
2009). Starting in the 1960s, the development of the VC industry corresponded to
the rapid growth of high-tech industries in Silicon Valley and by 1972, more than
thirty VC firms were located in the Bay Area (Zhang, 2007; Ferrary and Granovetter,
2009).1 Confronted with serious difficulties mobilizing funds and the need to share
information and expertise, these early venture capitalists progressively formed an
interactive community sharing information and engaging in co-investments (Saxenian,
1991).
1The US government also considerably contributed to the industrial fragmentation and the rapid
diffusion of technical information in Silicon Valley. Between 1955 and 1968, the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invested almost
300 million USD in production contracts for semiconductors. A large proportion of this investment
went to Silicon Valley. In addition, the US government was the largest market for new semiconductor
ventures during the 1960s and a large number of start-ups in Silicon Valley were directly backed by
military contracts (Kenney and von Burg, 2001).
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Venture capital was the main contributor to the funding of every surge of innovation
in the area, e.g., the establishment of the semiconductor industry in the 1960s, the
start of the personal computer industry and the biotech industry in the 1970s, the
thriving of the workstation and networking industries in the 1980s, as well as the
commercialization of the internet in the 1990s (Banatao and Fong, 2000 cited in
Zhang, 2007). In the past three decades, almost every successful start-up in Silicon
Valley received local venture capital funding, such as Hewlett Packard, National
Semiconductor, Intel, AMD, Oracle, Apple, Cisco Systems, Yahoo!, Ebay, and Google
(Zhang, 2007; Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009).
From 1992 to 2001, Silicon Valley constantly attracted more than 20% of the total
venture capital investment in the US. Attributable to the proximity to abundant
venture capital, start-ups could not only receive capital at a younger stage, but they
also completed more rounds of VC financing while raising higher amounts of money
in each round (Zhang, 2007).
Oftentimes, the entrepreneurs that succeeded in the Valley were the ones who invested
their returns in other technology start-ups and therefore became venture capitalists
themselves. They provided young promising enterprises not only with capital, but
also with their technical and managerial experience and access to their social network
(Saxenian, 1991). Thus, Silicon Valley encompasses a complete and robust complex
system of innovation that is strengthened by a large social network of interdependent
economic agents interacting at different levels (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009). It can
be described as an innovative cluster in which ethnic ties, university ties, friendship, as
well as past and current professional ties are interlinked in order to nourish innovation
and entrepreneurship (Saxenian, 1994 cited in Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009).
Financial, educational, and political institutions in Silicon Valley are connected not
only to technology firms, but also to one another, creating a distinct institutional
framework that has become crucial for economic success (Colapinto, 2007). These
social networks and personal contacts that are all located nearby highly facilitate the
access to venture capital (Zhang, 2007).
6 The Development of the Venture Capital Industries in the United States and
Europe 70
Venture capitalists can better share information, make deals and quicker mobilize
resources (Florida and Kenney, 1988). Geographic proximity also eases the venture
capitalists’ responsibilities such as monitoring and providing management advice for
the start-ups they invest in (Zhang, 2007).
Several VC firms often form a syndicate to invest in a start-up in order to split the
risks and to better share information. Hence, VC firms in a cluster that allows for
quick investment are more likely to develop these partnerships for joint investment
(Lee et al., 2000 cited in Zhang, 2007).
Apart from that, quick investment is also made possible by the emerging competition
among VC firms for investment opportunities. Lee et al. (2000) point out that many
VC firms located in the same area develop a rising awareness of competition, thus
forcing them to invest more quickly in a promising start-up in order to guarantee a
share of potentially high return.
The better access to capital in the Silicon Valley area is also a result of the well-
developed innovation supporting industries that are abundant there, e.g., legal services,
human resource services, investment banking, management consulting, or account-
ing services. These industries, together with the VC firms, establish a “clustered
community” that simplifies company creation (ibid.).
Consequently, a well-developed venture capital industry may not be the only sufficient
factor having generated high technology entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley, but the
great variety of support mechanisms for innovation and entrepreneurship played a
key role in this process (Florida and Kenney, 1988).
The institutional framework of the United States can be considered as very favorable
to entrepreneurs and formed the basis for the development of Silicon Valley as a
role model to other regions or communities. The outstanding innovation system in
the US is mainly shaped by world-class research universities, firms that prosper in
innovation-intensive sectors such as Information and Communications Technology
(ICT), biotechnology, energy and agriculture, and a globally unsurpassed level of both
R&D and market demand for innovative products (OECD, 2012a).
6 The Development of the Venture Capital Industries in the United States and
Europe 71
During the economic boom periods of Silicon Valley, changing jobs rapidly became a
widely accepted characteristic of the labor market. Working in start-ups was even
considered as an asset on the career path ever since. The flexible labor laws and the
overall social respect towards entrepreneurship highly reduced risk when becoming
an entrepreneur (as businesses can react quickly to changing market conditions) and
hence incentivized many to become self-employed (Saxenian, 1994 cited in Kenney
and Patton, 2006; Audretsch et al., 2002).
There are very few regulatory procedures to start and maintain a business and in
case of failure, an entrepreneur in the US does not have to fear stigma or persecution
by their creditors. Bankruptcy laws in the US offer individuals the opportunity to
start over again by means of a discharge. Furthermore, as the reward for his or her
innovative ideas is part of the main concerns of every entrepreneur, the US government
has actively enforced the legal protection of patent and intellectual property systems.
The cost of patent application in the US is lower in comparison to most European
countries. Finally, American entrepreneurs benefit from a relatively low tax burden,
which also affects their decision of starting a business (Audretsch et al., 2002).
Keeping in mind the institutional framework for entrepreneurs in the US, it is not
surprising that US-based VC firms show higher performance than Europe-based VC
firms, measured by type of exit and rate of return. Hege et al. (2003) explain this
difference mainly by the contractual relationship between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs: American venture capitalists more strongly insist on maintaining
contingent control rights; for example, they make use of certain financial instruments
such as convertible securities that help to maintain a controlling stake in case of poor
performance of the start-up. They also activate contingent control more often, which
was observed in the replacement of entrepreneurs and the closure of projects (Hege et
al., 2003).
The authors conclude further that overall, European venture capitalists encounter less
liquid markets, not only for human resources, but also for exit markets. Additionally,
they state that Europe does not contain the same web of institutions, experience,
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and profound markets and networks for human resources and knowledge that exists
in Silicon Valley, which may explain why the creation of a European Silicon Valley
could not yet be achieved.
Recent public policy in the US continues to stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship,
for example, through formal entrepreneurial education programs. The Kauffman Foun-
dation has recently granted 20 million USD for university funding of entrepreneurship
research. The Small Business Innovation Research Program also supports SMEs with
government R&D funding opportunities (OECD, 2012c).
What remains a challenge for the US in the years to come is the creation of a better
safety net. Individuals would be even more encouraged to start their own business
if the potential costs of failure for entrepreneurs and especially their families are
reduced. Notably, the Health Care Act of 2010 has made a great contribution to an
improved safety net by reducing the costs of individual or small group policies, further
incentivizing people to work for small firms. Encouraging small firms to offer qualified
employee retirement plans for the first time (which was proposed in the Fiscal Year
2013 budget plan) will also attract more candidates to small firms (OECD, 2012a).
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6.2 The VC Industry in Europe - France and Germany
6.2.1 France
Despite efforts of the French government to spark new business creation, very few
of the newly created (and publicly supported) enterprises have grown significantly
in their early years (OECD, 2013d). Innovative entrepreneurship in France remains
fragile, reflected in patents filed by young firms that are below the OECD median
(OECD, 2012c). This might be the result of the French regulatory framework that
still seems to hinder business growth significantly. Administrative barriers, tax rules,
rigid labor laws as well as difficulties in accessing capital as the banks have become
more risk averse in lending to start-ups, especially in the aftermath of the crisis, are
some of the factors that hold back entrepreneurs from starting their business, which
results in a low demand for VC investments in this area (OECD, 2013d).
A very important obstacle to French entrepreneurs and hence also to VC investors is
the country’s rigid labor law. In order to survive mistakes or fluctuating demand, it
is especially important for start-ups to be able to reduce staff rapidly and cheaply
(The Economist, 2012). However, measuring the strictness of employment protection
of workers with regular contracts against individual dismissal, France is placed at
least one standard deviation above the OECD average (OECD, 2013c). Internal
mobility and dismissal regulations (especially for collective dismissals) have been
strengthened and made more complex since the 1970s. Fortunately, the French
government aims to ease the dismissal regulations on permanent contracts in the
near future in order to remove the resulting labor market rigidities (OECD, 2014b).
The temporary contracts that count for the majority of French employees’ contracts
(90% of recruiting is done on temporary contracts) are often associated with higher
labor market flexibility. However, it is also extremely difficult to dismiss temporary
workers before the expiration date of the contract (Le Barbanchon and Malherbet,
2013; OECD, 2014b).
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The contract segmentation prevalent in France’s labor market hinders the businesses’
capacity to adapt to shocks and allocates the needed adjustments unequally between
the protected and exposed workers (OECD, 2014b).
Whereas high taxes shrink the income of small businesses, complex and opaque tax
systems can discourage (potential) entrepreneurs from founding a start-up (Audretsch
et al., 2002). The French tax system is very complex and contains a great number
of deductions, credits, and exemptions. New tax expenditures are often established
and existing ones are very frequently changed. Due to the complexity of the system,
tax compliance is burdensome for economic agents and rent-seeking activities easily
become attractive, generating considerable distortions (OECD, 2014b).2
Moreover, the French bankruptcy legislation might discourage entrepreneurs from
starting up as people expect it to take up to nine years until insolvent entrepreneurs
are fully discharged from their debts (The Economist, 2012).
The highly regulated and inflexibly structured organizations in France most likely
hinder entrepreneurial opportunities, too. As the French society is generally charac-
terized as risk averse, French businesses are strongly regulated and clearly structured
vertically as well as horizontally. Since a high value is placed on loyalty, potential
entrepreneurs are often discouraged to leave their wage source, resulting in low occu-
pational mobility. Furthermore, because of the strong need of uncertainty avoidance
within the French (business) culture, big firms are less likely to engage in synergies
with start-ups which also contributes to the slow growth of newly created enterprises
in France (Audretsch et al., 2002; Hofstede et al., 2010).
2The nominal tax rate on corporations with 34.4% is high in France and also the marginal tax
rates on high incomes are very steep. The new top rate for the personal income tax, along with
the exceptional tax on high incomes, the “contribution for repayment of social debt” and social
contributions by workers and employers infers a marginal rate of approximately 62% to 65% (OECD,
2013d).
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Inspired by the Silicon Valley role model, France has been putting great effort in the
creation of innovative clusters for more than thirty years now. The French government
tried to establish almost twenty “technopôles” in the 1970s, which unfortunately
brought about only a few high-tech start-ups. With the state support of 67 “pôles
de compétitivité”, the effort to nourish innovative clusters had been renewed in
2006. The French policymakers saw in these clusters a localized circle of universities,
research laboratories and high-tech firms, without any inclusion of VC firms in this
environment. Whereas 85% of these innovative clusters are not in the Paris area,
95% of the VC firms are based in Paris. Apart from that, the French government
has set up a public administration with an office in almost every cluster in order
to financially back start-ups. Apparently, French administrators did not take into
account the more informal function of VC firms, which goes far beyond the pure
financing function (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009).
Most recently, the public support for SMEs is managed through “Bpifrance”, a newly
created public financial institution which offers a personalized funding service in order
to support young enterprises at every development stage. Its goal is to expand the
existing credit volume and equity funds for SMEs, to bring stakeholders together and
simplify administrative procedures for entrepreneurs (OECD, 2014a). However, public
support of entrepreneurship is not as helpful as removing the barriers entrepreneurs
face within the French institutional framework (The Economist, 2012).
Having realized this, France authorities have begun to change framework conditions for
entrepreneurs in recent years. One example is the creation of a new legal status of the
auto-entrepreneur, which is a form of self-employment and enables the entrepreneur
to benefit from a more favorable tax system (OECD, 2012c). Furthermore, the 2012
competitiveness roadmap of the French government aimes at facilitating the access
to finance for SMEs. In particular, a tax reform encourages a better allocation of
savings towards enterprises and the launch of a new SME stock exchange in May
2013 is expected to offer young businesses better access to capital markets in the
years to come. Hopefully, this will also let the French venture capital industry grow
(OECD, 2014a).
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6.2.2 Germany
In Germany, limited access to finance for start-ups and SME innovation projects
hinder innovation (OECD, 2012c). Banks represent the most important source of
finance for the German VC industry and venture capital financing is still in a state of
development (Mayer et al., 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2004).
VC investment in Germany was standing at less than 0.03% of GDP in 2011, which
was lower than in France and in the UK. In order to increase VC investment, not only
support for financing is required, but also better exit possibilities for investors, which
is particularly problematic with regards to the absence of a stock market-oriented
system in Germany (OECD, 2014c). As stock markets are particularly appropriate to
the high risks of early-stage investments – because they enable the IPO exit possibility
- and bank-oriented systems to later-stage investments, early-stage investments are
limited among German venture capitalists (Black and Gilson, 1998 cited in Mayer et
al., 2005; Bascha and Walz, 2001 cited in Zimmermann et al., 2004).
The lack of an active stock market in Germany hindered the emergence of a German
venture capital industry (Black and Gilson, 1998 cited in Becker and Hellmann, 2003).
In the 1990s, Germany and other European countries created national stock markets
modeled after the NASDAQ that aimed to attract international and institutional
investors. However, by the time the Internet bubble burst, many of these national
stock markets merged with the main European stock markets that account for very
little IPO activity (Kümmerle, 2001). Because of the very limited IPO exit possibilities
for VC investments in Germany, big German companies have taken over the role
of venture capitalists and account for most of the main investments in start-ups.
Corporations like Deutsche Telekom, Axel Springer Verlag, and Rewe even have their
own start-up incubators. In addition, German venture capitalists seem to be cautious
as they invest more selectively and expect a high share to break even after the first
18 months (The Economist, 2013).
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The German society’s attitude towards entrepreneurship is still unenthusiastic, as
fewer than 50% of Germans polled by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)
thought that starting a business was an attractive idea. Apart from that, the fear of
failure is an important factor that holds potential entrepreneurs back: GEM finds
that failure would deter 42% of Germans from starting a business (The Economist,
2013). This is not surprising when looking at the German insolvency regime: people
expect it to take six years to free a bankrupt entrepreneur from his debts. Sometimes,
a bankrupt can even end in a lifetime ban on senior executive positions at big
corporations (ibid.). Consequently, many ambitious entrepreneurs simply leave the
country. There are now approximately 50,000 Germans in Silicon Valley where they
gain the “freedom to fail” (The Economist, 2012).
Germany’s labor law is another impediment for entrepreneurs. The regulation of
regular work contracts is one of the strictest among OECD countries, making layoffs
particularly difficult for employers. Moreover, the difference between employment
protection legislation of regular work contracts and fixed-term contracts is higher
than in many OECD countries. Like France, Germany should also move towards
a unified job contract with the degree of protection rising with tenure (Hüfner and
Klein, 2012).
Looking back through German history, the hesitancy towards entrepreneurship in
Germany becomes more obvious. Whereas a generation of entrepreneurs had built
up the after war economy in the fifties and early sixties, the next generation had
experienced different career incentives. Young Germans wanted to join large corpo-
rations and banks in order to take advantage of lifetime employment at high wages
and great benefits combined with a prestigious social status. Hence, an employee
that left his company in order to start a new business would have been confronted
with great difficulties to later be hired for a comparable job at another corporation.
Additionally, the returns to an entrepreneurial venture were limited by high tax rates
and failure would impose a negative stigma on the entrepreneur, and possibly ruin
her financially (Becker and Hellmann, 2003).
6 The Development of the Venture Capital Industries in the United States and
Europe 78
In order to change this longstanding attitude among young Germans, the public sector
tries to foster entrepreneurial culture in higher education with the EXIST program,
which offers start-up grants and ensures technology transfer among entrepreneurs
at German universities (OECD, 2012c). However, teaching methods in many of
Germany’s universities need to be improved by the use of more experience-based tools
such as developing prototypes and learning about enterprise failures. In particular,
German business schools need a considerable upgrade in order to compete with the
top European business schools (OECD, 2014c).
Remarkable policy efforts have improved the credit availability for SMEs since 2008
(OECD, 2014c): The German government is supporting funds of funds that invest in
local high-technology companies. This in turn helps private venture capital funds
as it increases the level of equity financing but leaves investment decisions to the
private fund’s management. Germany has also established a national public-private
high-technology start-up fund, and even at the local level did some states create
equity guarantee facilities for private investment in local SMEs (OECD, 2012c).
Outside public channels, the company builder “Rocket Internet” from Berlin is one of
the biggest sources of funding for start-ups. It is particularly famous for launching
lots of similar companies that can share resources and for copying successful ideas
from abroad (The Economist, 2013).
7 Conclusion
The paper provides an analysis of the determinants of early-stage venture capital
investments by economic, insitutional, as well as cultural framework conditions that
could explain the diverging levels of venture capital investments across countries. To do
so, data was assembled for 16 countries during the period from 1995 until 2013. Using
these data, hypotheses that relate economic, institutional, and cultural differences
among countries to the level of VC investments have been tested. Specifically,
these differences have been captured by the variation in GDP growth, openness, the
unemployment rate, R&D expenditures, the NASDAQ Composite Index, government
stability, socioeconomic conditions, bureaucracy quality, the investment profile, and
by the four cultural indices of Hofstede (1980); individualism, masculinity, power
distance and uncertainty avoidance.
The results of this work show that openness, R&D expenditures, the NASDAQ
Composite Index, socioeconomic conditions, as well as the degree of power distance,
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance in a country appear to be the main forces
behind the diverging levels of early-stage VC investments across countries. A country
that is more open to trade, measured by the variable openness, will bring about
higher levels in early-stage venture capital. Higher R&D expenditures as a proxy
for the technological and innovation capacity in a country as well as a higher value
in the NASDAQ Composite Index as a proxy for general stock market conditions
result in a higher amount of early-stage VC investments. As Schumpeter predicted,
entrepreneurial opportunities need the introduction of new knowledge created by
changes in technology, which are a result of the research and development process that
79
7 Conclusion 80
occurs in society. Higher R&D expenditures lead to more entrepreneurial opportunities,
resulting in a higher demand of early-stage VC investments. The regression results also
indicate that favorable socioeconomic conditions for both entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists will increase the demand for early-stage VC investments. Further, the
paper provides evidence that higher degrees of power distance and masculinity result
in more early-stage venture capital invested whereas a higher degree of uncertainty
avoidance negatively affects the level of early-stage VC funds. Masculine societies,
where the members of a society value achievement, competition, and success, show
a higher level of entrepreneurship which in turn leads to a higher demand for VC
investments. Moreover, the restrictive climate prevalent in large companies and
organizations of countries where centralized decision structures are valued more (thus
with a higher degree of power distance) incentivizes potential entrepreneurs to obtain
more autonomy by self-employment and hence demand for more VC investments
(Baum et al., 1993; Wennekers et al., 2007). As Knight (1921) pointed out, one of
the most important functions of the entrepreneur is to bear risk and to deal well
with uncertain situations. A society with a strong tendency to uncertainty avoidance,
fearing and avoiding unknown situations will thus most likely not bring about a high
level of entrepreneurs, resulting in less early-stage VC investments demanded.
Entrepreneurs need venture capital to make their new companies grow and hence have
a critical function for economic analysis. In addition to the empirical investigation,
the paper examines the role of the entrepreneur in economic history, dominated by
the three scholars: Schumpeter, Knight, and Kirzner.
The results of the paper’s empirical regression analysis have confirmed the importance
of a country’s institutional and cultural framework conditions for the venture capital
industry. The paper explores the venture capital industries in the United States
and in Europe, with particular focus on France and Germany, and identifies several
institutional and cultural characteristics that might explain the different levels in VC
investments in the respective countries. The role model of an institutional framework
that is exemplary for an innovative cluster with abundant venture capital is Silicon
Valley, which emerged with the help of financial, educational, and political institutions
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that are connected not only to technology firms, but also to one another (Colapinto,
2007). Apart from that, the United States created a very favorable institutional
environment for entrepreneurs with flexible labor laws, few regulatory procedures to
start and maintain a business, as well as advantageous bankruptcy laws (Audretsch
et al., 2002). In France, administrative barriers, complex and high taxes, and rigid
labor laws discourage entrepreneurs from starting their own business, resulting in a
lower demand for VC investments. In Germany, the lack of exit possibilities with
regards to the absence of a stock market-oriented system hinders venture capitalists
from investing in young German start-ups.
Representing an often overlooked predecessor for venture capital, the essential role of
the angel investment market for the formal venture capital industry is also illustrated
in this paper. Due to the recent financial crisis and the difficult situation worldwide,
angel investors were filling financing gaps left by banks and VC firms that were more
and more reluctant to invest at the early stage.
Most of the research on venture capital was concentrated on the United States so
that comparative studies of the VC industries in the US and in Europe remained rare.
This analysis contributes to the comparative literature on VC industries and extends
previous research by identifying not only economic and institutional factors, but also
cultural determinants that could affect the level of VC investments. Moreover, the
most recent dataset available has been used for this regression analysis. The study
therefore provides results that extend beyond the reach of the financial crisis as well
as the economic downturn during the European crisis.
The evidence the paper uncovered suggests that creating institutional conditions
that encourage entrepreneurship and nourish the venture capital industry should be
a high priority for national authorities. Such policy measures may include, among
many others, requiring fewer regulatory procedures to start and maintain a business,
ensuring a lower tax burden on entrepreneurs and private equity, passing flexible
labor laws and promoting education programs in universities and business schools to
develop an entrepreneurial culture, as well as public-private partnerships that support
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VC funding in local high-tech companies. As highlighted by Schröder (2013), a further
step to expand European early-stage VC investment might also be to support a single
European stock market which would make investment exits via IPOs possible and
therefore achieve higher returns for VC investments in Europe.
The study encountered several limitations which need to be considered when inter-
preting the results. Due to data unavailability, not all European countries could
be included in this study. Further, one must be very careful in transferring the
conclusions found in this analysis to world-wide relationships. The results hold for the
countries included in the study, which are industrialized, Western nations. Although
several control variables have been included in this study, it clearly has not been
controlled for all factors which may affect the level of VC investments in a country.
For example, the study did not consider labor market rigidities, financial reporting
standards or contractual relationship characteristics between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Hege et al., 2003). It also has to be noted
that empirical research between cultural characteristics of a country and the venture
capital market is quite new. Measurement might therefore be often controversial
while data points are usually low. As more data becomes available, this should only
increase the predictive power of the model.
Finally, the present study assumes that VC firms invest only in start-ups in their
own country so that the size of a country’s venture capital industry depends in part
on the factors explaining the emergence of new firms in need of such financing in
that country. While there is at present an overwhelming evidence for such a “home
bias” in venture capital financing, it has to be noted that there are some European
entrepreneurs that actually obtain VC funding from American investors. If, as it
is not unlikely, there were to be in the future a globalization of the venture capital
market, the size of a country’s venture capital industry would become relatively
independent of the factors explaining the emergence of new firms in that country
and would reflect mainly its comparative advantage in this kind of financial activity.
Whether such financing is reported in the data for U.S. or European venture capital
financing is a question we were not able to resolve.
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Future research could expand the data set and include all European countries in the
study in order to make a robust Europe-US comparison possible. Moreover, further
research should examine whether and how the results would be affected if countries at
significantly different economic development stages, such as developing and emerging
economies, were included in the study. Finally, future research will tell whether the
implemented policy measures by France, Germany, and other European countries will
effectively foster entrepreneurship and nourish the European venture capital industry
over time.
Agreeing with Landes (2000, p. 2), who argued that “If we learn anything from the
history of economic development, it is that culture makes almost all the difference”,
the paper confirmed that institutional and cultural characteristics are a crucial
determinant of a country’s VC industry. By setting the right incentives, institutions
determine the development of young innovative companies. Being aware that a change
towards an entrepreneurial culture is relatively difficult for societies and certainly
takes time, setting up entrepreneur- and investor-friendly institutions is one essential
step towards a vital venture capital market, more dynamic high-growth start-ups,
further technological innovation, and hence towards economic growth.
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